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THE POSSIBILITY OF PROSECUTING
CORPORATIONS FOR CLIMATE CRIMES
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: ALL ROADS LEAD TO THE
ROME STATUTE?
Donna Minha*

I. Introduction
In its most recent “Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation”
1
(issued in September 2016), the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”) declared that it would
2

give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes
that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural re3
sources, or the illegal dispossession of land.
The policy paper, which has yet to be practically implemented, was is4
sued in conjunction with the conviction in the Al Mahdi case, in which Mr.
Al Mahdi was prosecuted solely for the war crime of attacking historic and
5
religious buildings in Timbuktu. Though not facially related to environmental crimes, the Al Madhi case may be seen as demonstrating the OTP’s
willingness to prosecute crimes which were not committed directly against
6
people, but still have a powerful effect on them. Therefore, this case may
*
Ph.D. candidate, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to express my
sincere gratitude and great appreciation to Professor Yuval Shany and Professor David
Hunter, my research supervisors, for their incredibly valuable guidance. I would also like to
thank Lindsay Bernsen Wardlaw and the editors at the Michigan Journal of International Law
for their excellent editorial work.
1.
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR [“OTP”], POLICY PAPER ON CASE SELECTION AND
PRIORITISATION, ¶ 41 (2016) [hereinafter OTP Policy Paper].
2.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
(entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3.
OTP POLICY PAPER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 7, 40, 41. The OTP has also noted that it will
“seek to cooperate and provide assistance to States, upon request, with respect to conduct
which constitutes a serious crime under national law, such as the illegal exploitation of natural
resources, arms trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, financial crimes, land grabbing or
the destruction of the environment.”
4.
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 27,
2016).
5.
Id. ¶¶ 2, 10.
6.
See also OTP POLICY PAPER, supra note 1, ¶ 46 (stating that “[t]he Office . . . will
also pay particular attention to attacks against cultural, religious, historical and other protected
491
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serve as another indication of the general direction in which the OTP seeks
to move with regard to the investigation and prosecution of environmental
crimes.
In this context, it goes without saying that non-state actors such as multinational corporations, are frequently implicated in environmental destruc7
tion. Thus, arguably, the goal of investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes—as set forth by the OTP in its policy paper—would not be
completely achieved without taking into account environmental harm
caused by multinational corporations. Thus, this article explores the possibility of prosecuting multinational corporations for environmental crimes
before the ICC, and evaluates the applicability of the different core crimes
listed in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the Rome
Statute” or “the Statute”) to corporate environmental crimes.
As a test case, this article will focus on the allegedly illegal conduct of
oil and gas corporations that has been claimed to substantially contribute to
climate change and to its devastating effects. Today, scientists can trace the
contributions of individual companies to specific climate impacts, such as
8
the increase in global surface temperatures and sea level rise. As a result,
the causal chain between global greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions attributed to a small number of oil and gas corporations, on one hand, and severe climate impacts, on the other hand, is getting clearer. These scientific
advances are accompanied by the publication of documents and studies suggesting that the oil and gas industry had knowledge of climate change as
early as sixty years ago, and yet, it has actively promoted climate change
denial using industry-funded research aimed at increasing public skepticism
9
about climate change.
There have been several attempts to hold certain oil and gas companies
accountable for their allegedly illegal conduct at the national level, either
10
through lawsuits brought by state Attorneys General in the United States,
objects”). The ICC Trial Chamber VIII subsequently convicted Mr. Al Mahdi and sentenced
him to nine years of imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 63,
109.
7.
See HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (4th ed.
2011), at 1374–75.
8.
See infra Part II.
9.
See infra Part II.B.
10.
On October 24, 2018, New York’s Attorney General filed a complaint against Exxon Mobil in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The complaint stated that:
This case seeks redress for a longstanding fraudulent scheme by Exxon, one of the
world’s largest oil and gas companies, to deceive investors and the investment
community, including equity research analysts and underwriters of debt securities
(together, “investors”), concerning the company’s management of the risks posed
to its business by climate change regulation. Exxon provided false and misleading
assurances that it is effectively managing the economic risks posed to its business
by the increasingly stringent policies and regulations that it expects governments to
adopt to address climate change . . .

2020]

Prosecuting Climate Crimes at the ICC

493

claiming deceitful acts against investors and consumers, or through actions
mainly brought by U.S. counties and cities, seeking money damages for
11
climate change-related losses. Cases of the latter kind are anticipated to
increase with the growing body of research and documents demonstrating
12
the causal link between GHG emissions and specific climate impacts.
It may be argued that, in addition to these proceedings, the alleged conduct of the fossil fuel corporations should also be of concern to the international community as a whole due to its widespread and irreversible consequences, which go far beyond national borders and impact communities,
wildlife, and future generations. Arguably, those who are found responsible
for these impacts should be held criminally accountable for their conduct in
the international sphere, as “a reflection of the ‘outraged conscience of the
Complaint ¶ 1, New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 65 Misc. 3d 1233 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2019)
(No. 452044/2018), 2019 WL 679577165. The case was dismissed on December 10, 2019. In
its dismissal, the court pointed out that,
[n]othing in this opinion is intended to absolve ExxonMobil from responsibility for
contributing to climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases in the
production of its fossil products. ExxonMobil does not dispute either that its operations produce greenhouse gases or that greenhouse gases contribute to climate
change. But ExxonMobil is in business of producing energy, and this is a securities
fraud case, not a climate change case.
New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 2019 WL 679577165, at *2 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. 2019). In October 2019, a complaint was filed against ExxonMobil by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, claiming that the company “systematically and intentionally, has
misled Massachusetts investors and consumers about climate change.” Complaint ¶ 1, Massachusetts v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (Super. Ct. Mass. filed Oct. 24, 2019) (No. 19-1333).
On June 24 2020, the state of Minnesota filed a complaint against the American Petroleum
Institute, Exxon Mobil Corp and Koch Industries, seeking to hold them
accountable for deliberately undermining the science of climate change, purposefully downplaying the role that the purchase and consumption of their products
played in causing climate change and the potentially catastrophic consequences of
climate change, and for failing to fully inform the consumers and the public of their
understanding that without swift action, it would be too late to ward off the devastation.
Complaint ¶ 8, Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst. et al. (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (No. 62-CV20-3837),
https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2020/docs/ExxonKochAPI_
Complaint.pdf.
11.
Cities and counties in California, New York, Colorado, Washington state, and Maryland have filed civil lawsuits against oil and gas companies seeking to hold them responsible
for the costs of dealing with the consequences of climate change. See David Hasemyer, Fossil
Fuels on Trial: Where the Major Climate Change Lawsuits Stand Today, INSIDE CLIMATE
NEWS (July 22, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/04042018/climate-change-fossilfuel-company-lawsuits-timeline-exxon-children-california-cities-attorney-general; see also
SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, Climate Change Litigation Database,
http://climatecasechart.com.
12.
See CHRIS WOLD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 783 (2009); James
Salzman & David Hunter, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1763 (2007).
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13

world.’” Therefore, this article focuses on the possibility of investigating
and prosecuting fossil fuel companies for the crimes listed in the Rome
Statute.
This notion poses a twofold challenge: First, it requires an expansion of
the list of potential perpetrators to include multinational corporations (the
Court’s personal jurisdiction). Second, it requires recognition of a new pattern of crime as within the jurisdiction of the Court (subject-matter jurisdiction). Both moves should be examined with caution since, as a source of international criminal law, the Rome Statute is governed by the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”). Additionally, any effort
to hold corporations accountable for alleged climate crimes is limited to acts
14
committed after the entry into force of the Statute in 2002.
This article will proceed as follows: After a brief overview of the latest
studies regarding the alleged conduct of the oil and gas industry, and its
contribution to the climate crisis, the article will explore the issue of the
Court’s personal jurisdiction, i.e., whether criminal responsibility may be
attributed to legal persons—such as corporations—under the Rome Statute.
This will be followed by a discussion of subject-matter jurisdiction, in
which the article will examine whether the alleged conduct of fossil fuel
companies amounts to one or more of the core crimes defined in the Rome
Statute. In this context, the article will analyze the elements of different core
crimes in light of the jurisprudence of relevant criminal tribunals, as well as
the elements’ drafting history and their object and purpose. This will be followed by an examination of different procedural hurdles to prosecuting climate crimes. Finally, the article will assess whether the Rome Statute’s existing crimes may and should be interpreted to include environmental
crimes.

II. Recent Studies and Research with Regard to the
Oil and Gas Industry
In the past several years, there has been a proliferation of studies pertaining to fossil fuel companies, which can be classified into two categories:
The first category of studies demonstrates the causal link between specific
damages and emissions attributed to major fossil fuel producers (this category will be referred to as “causation studies”). The second category focuses
on the conduct of the oil and gas industry, suggesting that fossil fuel and
cement companies knew about climate change and its devastating impacts,
and yet, they did not disclose this information to the public and to their
shareholders and even engaged in activities aimed at spreading uncertainty
and skepticism with regard to this issue (this category of studies will be re-

13.
PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET 113 (2016) (citing ELIHU LAUTERPACHT,
LIFE OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 274 (2010)).
14.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 11, 24; see infra Part V.
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ferred to as “conduct studies and findings”). Both categories of research are
presented below.

A. Causation Studies
In a 2013 study, researcher Richard Heede provided a quantitative analysis of historic emissions of industrial carbon dioxide and methane from
1751 through 2010, focusing on fossil fuel producers and cement manufac15
turers. This research identified that a group of ninety corporate investorowned and state-owned producers of fossil fuels and cement was responsi16
ble for approximately two-thirds of industrial carbon emissions. This
groundbreaking study showed for the first time that a relatively small number of corporations, that have been benefitting from emitting greenhouse
17
gases to the atmosphere, made a major contribution to global warming.
Subsequently, an analysis released by the Climate Accountability Institute and Carbon Disclosure Project in June 2017 demonstrated that twentyfive corporate and state-owned fossil fuel producing entities have accounted
18
for 51% of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions since 1988.
19
In a 2017 study, Richard Heede, together with researchers from the
Union of Concerned Scientists and Oxford University (building on his earlier 2013 study), managed to link these historic emissions to specific climate
impacts. The model-based study quantified the contribution of historical and
recent emissions traced to ninety major industrial carbon producers
and the historical rise in global atmospheric CO2, surface temperatures, and
20
sea level.
15.
Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to
Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATE CHANGE 229, 220 (2014).
16.
Id. at 234–35. In an update released in October 2019, Professor Heede and the Climate Accountability Institute published new data showing that from 1965 to 2017, the twenty
largest fossil fuel companies have emitted 35% of all fossil fuel emissions worldwide. See
CLIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTE, Carbon Majors: Update of Top Twenty Companies
1965–2017 (Oct. 9, 2019), https://climateaccountability.org/pdf/CAI%20PressRelease
%20Top20%20Oct19.pdf.
17.
See David Hunter, Making Private Companies Pay Their Share for Climate
Change: A New Study Could Revive Climate Change Litigation, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM: CPR BLOG (Nov. 26, 2013), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=
9571E4DE-EB05-C8DC-9BC39306A6CCED17 (arguing that this study is a potential game
changer, since it shows that people and private companies are not equally responsible for climate change).
18.
See PAUL GRIFFIN, CLIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTE, THE CARBON MAJORS
DATABASE CDP CARBON MAJORS REPORT 8 (2017), https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/002/3
27/original/Carbon-Majors-Report-2017.pdf.
19.
See B. Ekwurzel et al., The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2, Surface Temperature,
and Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144 CLIMATE CHANGE
579, 579 (2017).
20.
Id. The study showed that “emissions traced to these 90 carbon producers contributed <57% of the observed rise in atmospheric CO2, <42–50% of the rise in global mean sur-
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B. Conduct Studies and Findings
21

In a study published in 2017, two Harvard University researchers
made an empirical, document-by-document analysis and comparison of the
text of 187 communications related to climate change released voluntarily
22
by ExxonMobil. They examined whether these communications sent con23
sistent messages about the state of climate science and its implications.
They concluded that “[a]vailable documents show a discrepancy between
what ExxonMobil’s scientists and executives discussed about climate
change privately and in academic circles and what it presented to the gen24
eral public.” The study found that in private, the company “broadly
acknowledged that anthropogenic global warming (“AGW”) is real, humancaused, serious, and solvable, while identifying reasonable uncertainties that
25
most climate scientists readily acknowledged at that time.” However, “[i]n
contrast, ExxonMobil’s advertorials in the NYT overwhelmingly emphasized only the uncertainties, promoting a narrative inconsistent with the
26
views of most climate scientists, including ExxonMobil’s own.” The study
concluded that, “In light of these findings, . . . ExxonMobil’s AGW communications were misleading,” but the researchers could not judge “whether
27
they violated any laws.”
Additionally, a comprehensive report by the Center for International
Environmental Law (“CIEL”), published in November 2017, presented a
synthesis of the available evidence “on what the oil industry knew about
climate science, when they knew it, and what they did with the infor28
mation.” This report found that “[t]he oil industry was expressly warned of
the potential severity of climate risks by its own consulting scientists in
1968 and repeatedly thereafter,” and that “[n]umerous industry documents
demonstrate these risks were communicated by industry scientists to execu29
tives at the highest levels of the industry over the ensuing decades.” The
face temperature (GMST), and <26–32% of global sea level (GSL) rise over the historical period and <43% (atmospheric CO2), <29–35% (GMST), and <11–14% (GSL) since 1980.” Id.
21.
Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil’s Climate Change
Communications (1977–2014), 2017 ENV’T RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2017).
22.
These documents were released by ExxonMobil itself, wishing to demonstrate that
allegations against it were baseless. The company challenged the public to “read all of these
documents and make up your own mind.” Id. at 1–2.
23.
Id. at 2.
24.
Id. at 15.
25.
Id. at 15.
26.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15.
27.
28.
CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES: THE LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR HOLDING
BIG OIL ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS 36 (2017), https://www.ciel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/Smoke-Fumes.pdf [hereinafter CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT].
Appendix II of the report describes the different sources on which the report builds.
29.
Id. at 24.
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report also suggested that “industry research into air pollution issues was
highly coordinated and shared widely within the industry, and included re30
search into fossil carbon in the atmosphere by no later than 1958.” However, despite this, “[i]ndustry records and other sources indicate that this coordinated industry research program was used to mobilize public opposition
to the regulation of air pollutants by sowing doubt regarding air pollution
31
science.”
The report demonstrated that “[i]n late 1946, executives from the major
petroleum companies . . . established the ‘Committee on Smoke and Fumes
of the Western Oil and Gas Association’ to fund research into the causes of
32
air pollution in Southern California.” The report further noted that:
Industry records, oral histories from persons involved, and analyses
of its activities by independent researchers strongly indicate that the
core mission of the Smoke and Fumes Committee was to combine
industry-funded research and public relations advocacy in order to
increase public skepticism about air pollution science, with the express purpose of influencing legislation and regulation on pollution
33
issues.
The report also showed that “[e]ven while blocking public action to address climate change, oil companies took steps to protect their own assets
from climate risks. This divergence between industry communications to the
public and industry action to safeguard their own investments began as early
34
as the 1970s and is well established by the 1980s.” The report concluded
that “[n]otwithstanding their own best information, leading oil companies
and industry associations actively participated in or funded climate misinformation efforts for decades through media intended to reach wide audi35
ences of consumers, investors, and the general public.”
Whereas the research and studies mentioned above focus on U.S. companies, similar efforts were allegedly made by fossil fuel companies in other
jurisdictions as well. According to the report,
[e]vidence suggests that European companies such as British Petroleum (United Kingdom) and Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands and
United Kingdom) participated in multiple aspects of US climate
denial efforts dating back to the original Smoke and Fumes Com-

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24.
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mittee, either directly through their US subsidiaries or through
36
companies they later acquired.
Other publications also suggest that European oil and gas companies have
37
lobbied against climate action and clean energy.

C. Interim Conclusions
In summary, scientific advances make it possible to quantifiably link
the contribution of GHG emissions attributed to a relatively small number
of companies and specific climate impacts. Additionally, a growing body of
research indicates that fossil fuel companies allegedly led a disinformation
campaign for decades, while peddling a product they knew with substantial
certainty would increase temperatures enough to cause the impacts of climate change.
This article will examine whether the alleged conduct of fossil fuel
companies may be prosecuted as a crime before the ICC. First, however, the
article will explore the issue of criminal responsibility of legal persons under the Rome Statute.

III. Corporate Liability Under the Rome Statute
Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.” This language was
aimed at clarifying, in “an indirect way . . . that the Court does not have ju38
risdiction over corporate bodies.”
The controversy pertaining to the inclusion of legal persons within the
jurisdiction of the Court was described by the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court:
There is a deep divergence of views as to the advisability of including criminal responsibility of legal persons in the Statute. Many
delegations are strongly opposed, whereas some strongly favour its
inclusion. Others have an open mind. Some delegations hold the
view that providing for only the civil or administrative responsibil-

36.
Id. at 25; see also CIEL, A CRACK IN THE SHELL: NEW DOCUMENTS EXPOSE A
HIDDEN CLIMATE HISTORY (2018), https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ACrack-in-the-Shell-April-2018.pdf.
37.
CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 25; see also Arthur Neslen,
BP Lobbied Against EU Support for Clean Energy to Favour Gas, Documents Reveal,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/20/bplobbied-against-eu-support-clean-energy-favour-gas-documents-reveal; Arthur Neslen, BP
Tops the List of Firms Obstructing Climate Action in Europe, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/21/bp-tops-the-list-of-firms-obstructingclimate-action-in-europe.
38.
See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 564 (2d ed.
2016) [hereinafter SCHABAS COMMENTARY].
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ity/liability of legal persons could provide a middle ground. This
avenue, however, has not been thoroughly discussed. Some delegations, who favour the inclusion of legal persons, hold the view that
this expression should be extended to organizations lacking legal
39
status.
The final decision to exclude legal persons from the Court’s jurisdiction
was based on several grounds. When the provision was drafted, the concept
of corporate liability was not universally recognized, and many states did
not allow for corporate criminal responsibility under their domestic legal
regimes; thus, it was claimed, the inclusion of such a provision would have
proved to be a major obstacle with regard to the principle of complementari40
ty (article 17 of the Statute), according to which the states have the primary responsibility to prosecute international crimes. There were also concerns
with regard to the ramifications such a move would have on evidentiary issues, and it was claimed that “the inclusion of collective liability would de41
tract from the Court’s jurisdictional focus, which is on individuals.” When
these issues could not be settled by consensus in the time allotted, the drafters finally chose to explicitly include only natural persons in the language of
42
article 25(1).
However, twenty years after the drafting of the Rome Statute, a growing number of legal systems across the globe have recognized the principle
43
of corporate criminal liability for atrocity crimes, by adding offenses pertaining to corporate liability to their criminal codes. 44 This development has
been accompanied by international instruments, such as multinational treaties, aimed at holding corporations accountable through provisions on cor45
porate criminal liability. Other developments regarding corporate criminal
4F

39.
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Addendum, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, ¶ 49, n.3 (Apr. 14,
1998).
40.
See OTTO TRIFFTERER & KAI AMBOS, A COMMENTARY TO THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 986 (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter TRIFFTERER
COMMENTARY]; Caroline Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability Under International Criminal Law, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L. REV. 351, at 353.
41.
TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 986.
42.
See Brief from David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a
Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 2011 WL 6813576, at
14 (U.S., Dec. 20, 2011).
43.
Kaeb, supra note 40, at 351–52 (2016); see also Brief from David J. Scheffer as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 6.
44.
See Kaeb, supra note 40, at 352.
45.
Id. at 352 n.5; CEDRIC RYNGAERT & JEAN D’ASPREMONT, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW ASSOCIATION WASHINGTON CONFERENCE NON-STATE ACTORS 3RD REPORT
PREPARED BY THE CO-RAPPORTEURS (2014). Interestingly, many of these treaties are environmental ones.
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liability in the international sphere that may indicate a somewhat similar
trend are examined below.

A. The STL Contempt Case
In a decision issued in October 2014, the appeals panel of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) held that the term “person” in rule 60 bis of
46
the STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence should be interpreted to include legal entities, allowing contempt charges to be brought against a cor47
porate entity (New TV S.A.L.).
The Tribunal noted “the growing number of states criminalizing the acts
48
and conducts of legal persons,” and the “concrete movement on an international level backed by the United Nations for, inter alia, corporate account49
ability.” The Tribunal also referred to a recent study commissioned by the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights concerning the effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms in relation to corporations, which
concluded that “most jurisdictions appear to recognise the possibility of
corporate criminal responsibility (if not as a general concept then at least in
50
relation to specific offences or types of offences).”
The Tribunal further stressed that “[i]nternational law has long since
recognised the exposure of non-human entities to liability under internation51
al standards,” referring to the enforcement of the international prohibition
52
on the slave trade by condemning the vessel involved and to the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg, which authorized
53
the designation of “any group or organisation as criminal.”
The Tribunal concluded that “given all the developments outlined
above, corporate criminal liability is on the verge of attaining, at the very
least, the status of a general principle of law applicable under international

46.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON [“STL”], Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/legal-documents/rules-of-procedure-and-evidence (last
visited June 3, 2020).
47.
In the Case Against New TV S.A.L. & Karma Mohamed Tahsin al Khayat, STL14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in
Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 74 (Special Trib. for Leb. Oct. 2, 2014).
48.
Id. ¶ 44.
49.
Id. ¶ 46 (citing the U.N. Human Rights Council, The U.N. Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011)).
50.
Id. ¶¶ 52, 55. The Tribunal acknowledged that some jurisdictions do not recognize
this possibility, but stated that “[t]his does not mean that corporate entities in these jurisdictions (which include Germany, Italy and Ukraine) enjoy complete impunity. Instead, corporate
wrongdoing is dealt with through a system of administrative offences and penalties.” Id. ¶ 49.
51.
Id. ¶ 61.
52.
Id. ¶ 61.
53.
Id. ¶ 63.
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54

law” and added that it “simply cannot ignore the reality that many corporations today wield far more power, influence and reach than any one per55
son.” The tribunal also noted that “the prosecution of natural persons, rather than the legal persons that they serve, would fail to underline and
punish corporate cultures that condone and in some cases encourage illegal
behaviour. Punishing only natural persons in such circumstances would be a
poor response where the need for accountability lies beyond any one
56
person.”
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Akoum asserted that “the word ‘person’
57
as contained in Rule 60 bis cannot be interpreted to include legal persons.”
Hence, he was of the view that New TV S.A.L. could not be charged with
contempt.
It should be emphasized though, that Judge Akoum “offer[ed] no view
on whether or not customary international law or general principles of law
presently recognise corporate criminal liability,” and his approach derived
from the “fundamental and holy principles of criminal law: nullum crimen
sine lege scripta (crimes must be based on written provisions), nullum
crimen sine lege stricta (strict construction of criminal provisions) and in
58
dubio pro reo (when in doubt, side for the accused).”
Though the STL Contempt decision is a significant development in the
context of international corporate criminal liability, the applicability of this
decision to the ICC is limited, for three main reasons. First, the context of
the decision as a contempt decision (which relates to the STL’s Rules of
Procedure and not to the crimes listed in the STL Statute) makes it less relevant with respect to the prosecution of legal entities for the core crimes
listed in the Rome Statute. Second, there is a major difference between the
language of the provisions at issue: Whereas rule 60 bis of the STL Rules of
Procedure and Evidence uses the word “person,” article 25(1) of the Rome
Statute explicitly refers to “natural persons.” This is all the more striking as
rule 2 of the STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence defines a “victim” as “a
natural person;” therefore, there is a strong case that the use of the general
term “person” in article 60 bis may refer to either a natural person or a legal
one. Third, the hybrid nature of the Tribunal, which applies domestic Leba59
60
nese law, also limits the relevance of this decision to the ICC.

54.
Id. ¶ 67.
55.
Id. ¶ 82.
56.
Id. ¶ 83.
57.
Id. ¶ 26 (Akoum, J., dissenting).
58.
Id. ¶ 2 (Akoum, J., dissenting).
59.
According to article 2 to the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code are applicable to the prosecution and punishment of the
crimes referred to in article 1. Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 2, U.N. Doc
S/RES/1757 (2007).
See GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JESSBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
60.
CRIMINAL LAW 28, ¶ 83 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that “[t]he hybrid courts’ jurisprudence, how-
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B. The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights
In 2014, the African Union adopted a “Protocol on Amendments to the
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,”
which adds an international criminal law section to the African Court of Jus61
tice and Human and Peoples’ Rights. Article 46C(1) of the Protocol explicitly states that “[f]or the purpose of this Statute, the [African] Court shall
62
have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States.” The
Protocol then goes into further detail about corporate intention, attribution,
63
and corporate knowledge.
Also notable in this context is the list of crimes under the jurisdiction of
the court, which includes, in addition to “traditional” international crimes
such as crimes against humanity, the crime of “Trafficking in Hazardous
64
65
Wastes” and the crime of “Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources.”
66
It should be noted that the Protocol has not yet entered into force. Additionally, while this Protocol undoubtedly represents a trend toward corporate criminal responsibility in the international sphere, its implications with
regard to the ICC are limited, due to the lack of an equivalent provision in
the Rome Statute.

C. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on
Crimes Against Humanity
67

In its sixty-eighth session (2016), the Drafting Committee of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) provisionally adopted draft articles 5
68
through 10 on crimes against humanity. Draft article 5(7) states that
ever, is in most cases much less relevant for the evolution of international criminal law than
that of the United Nations ad hoc Tribunals”).
61.
African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (June 27, 2014), https://au.int/sites/default/files/
treaties/36398-treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_
the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf.
62.
Id. art. 46C(1).
63.
For instance, article 46C(2) states that “[c]orporate intention to commit an offence
may be established by proof that it was the policy of the corporation to do the act which constituted the offence.” Id. art. 46C(2). According to article 46C(3), “[a] policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the most reasonable explanation of the conduct of that
corporation.” Id. art. 46C(3). And article 46C(4) states that “[c]orporate knowledge of the
commission of an offence may be established by proof that the actual or constructive
knowledge of the relevant information was possessed within the corporation.” Id. art. 46C(4).
64.
Id. art. 28A(12).
65.
Id. art. 28A(13).
66.
Id. art. 11 (“The Protocol and the Statute annexed to it shall enter into force thirty
(30) days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by fifteen (15) Member States.”) This
condition has not yet been fulfilled.
67.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/71/10 (2016) (at its 3312th and 3325th meetings, on 9 June and 21 July 2016 respectively).
68.
Id. at 246–77.
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[s]ubject to the provisions of its national law, each State shall take
measures, where appropriate, to establish the liability of legal persons for the offences referred to in this draft article. Subject to the
legal principles of the State, such liability of legal persons may be
69
criminal, civil or administrative.
By provisionally adopting this draft article, the ILC clarified that private corporations may be prosecuted for crimes against humanity. Still, according to the ILC itself, the liability of legal persons at the national level
may take different forms, and not necessarily a criminal one. The ILC emphasized that “there is no obligation to establish criminal liability if doing so
is inconsistent with a State’s national legal principles; in those cases, a form
70
of civil or administrative liability may be used as an alternative.” Hence,
while this is certainly a step forward with regard to international corporate
liability in general, it has limited implications with regard to corporate criminal liability.

D. Interim Conclusions
In summary, there is indisputably a trend towards the recognition of
71
corporate liability. Though this trend is more evident at the national level,
the developments described above may indicate a similar movement in the
international sphere. In any event, it is probably too early to predict whether
this trend will manifest itself in criminal responsibility or in other forms of
liability.
Additionally, it should be emphasized that even if corporate criminal liability may be considered a general principle in international law, as the majority in the STL Contempt decision believed, the explicit language of article
25(1) constitutes a major hurdle with regard to prosecuting corporations before the ICC. As opposed to the examples discussed above—the STL Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, the amendments to the Protocol on the Statute
of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and the ILC’s draft article on crimes against humanity—the text of article 25(1) to the Rome Statute explicitly applies only to natural persons. Perhaps, then, the only way
for the Rome Statute to apply to legal entities is through an amendment to
the Statute adding a provision dealing with jurisdiction over legal

69.
Id. at 248. The same text was adopted by the ILC in its sixty-ninth session (on May
26, 2017). Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session: Crimes Against
Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.892 (2017).
70.
See id. at 262–65 (describing the current state of liability for legal persons in international law).
71.
See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
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entities. However, this may prove to be “extremely difficult to achieve dip72
lomatically.”
It is important to note, though, that the Rome Statute’s current treatment
of legal persons does not avoid liability for corporate actions. The Court
may hold individual perpetrators accountable for the crimes they have
committed, without allowing a legal entity to shield them. As stated in the
Nuremberg trials, “Crimes against international law are committed by men,
not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
73
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” Therefore, regardless of whether legal entities are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, corporate managers and executives fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, and
may be prosecuted as “natural persons.”
In this context, it should be noted that both OTP regulation 34(1) and
the OTP’s 2016 Policy Paper direct the Office to conduct its investigations
in a way that ensures that charges are brought against “the person or persons
74
who appear to be the most responsible.” It is not clear, however, who is
“the most responsible” in the context of corporate crimes: Is it the corporation itself, or perhaps the corporate officials allegedly involved in the corpo75
rate actions?
As Caroline Kaeb has noted, “attributing liability merely to the individual managers would not be an accurate reflection of blameworthiness when
dealing with crimes committed through collective corporate action” and
“mere individual criminal prosecution would not lead to the organizational
change necessary at the firm level to reform corporate policies and struc76
tures that have facilitated the commitment of the crimes in the first place.”
From this perspective, in order to make the necessary impact at the firm level, as well as hold the individual accountable, perhaps both the corporation
and corporate officials should be prosecuted.
In conclusion, it seems that there are substantial hurdles to prosecution
of corporations under the Rome Statute, as the current language of article
25(1) does not readily allow such interpretation. This does not mean, of
course, that corporations cannot be prosecuted at the national level. And, in
72.
David Scheffer, Corporate Liability Under the Rome Statute, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J.
37, 38 (2016, Online Symposium) (claiming that states that economically rely on the activity
of multinational corporations would oppose such efforts).
73.
United States et al. v. Goring et al., Judgment, Trial of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal—Official Documents, at 223 (Nuremberg, 1947).
74.
Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009).
Regulation 34 (1) is also mentioned in the OTP Policy Paper, supra note 1, ¶ 42.
75.
It should be noted that “most responsible” may be read as a relative term, that is,
most responsible among those subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
76.
Caroline Kaeb, A New Penalty Structure for Corporate Involvement in Atrocity
Crimes: About Prosecutors and Monitors, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 20, 21 (2016, online symposium) (also mentioning that “[t]he literature on organizational behavior has established that optimal deterrence and retribution can be achieved by targeting both the responsible individual
and the firm . . .”).
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any event, as mentioned above, corporate officials may be prosecuted as
“natural persons.”
The article will now consider the applicability of the different Rome
Statute crimes to the alleged conduct of the fossil fuel companies, focusing
on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

IV. Can Climate Crimes Be Categorized Within Any of the
Rome Statute’s Core Crimes?
A. Climate Crimes as War Crimes
As the name of this category of crimes implies, the existence of an
77
armed conflict is an essential element for the prosecution of war crimes.
Thus, crimes committed in times of peace do not fall within the scope of
78
this category of crimes. Accordingly, only environmental crimes that “took
79
place in the context of and [were] associated with an . . . armed conflict”
may constitute a crime under article 8 of the Rome Statute. Whereas environmental destruction is in many cases an integral part of crimes committed
80
in the context of an armed conflict, it may be reasonably assumed that climate crimes are generally not associated with an armed conflict, thus making this category of crimes of less relevance to the current discussion.
Still, it should be noted that when article 8 applies, several provisions of
this article pertain to the destruction of property or damage to the natural
environment. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) criminalizes the act of “[i]ntentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause . . . widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall mili81
tary advantage anticipated.” This definition was inspired by the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (“Additional Protocol
82
I”), articles 35(3) and 55(1). Article I(1) to the Convention on the Prohibi-

77.
See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 228.
78.
Id.
79.
International Criminal Court, ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11, Elements of Crimes art. 8,
(2011) (on war crimes) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
80.
See Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session: Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, Text and Titles of the Draft Principles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.937 (Apr. 29–June 7 and July 8–Aug. 9 2019).
81.
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
82.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note
40, at 378–79.
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tion of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
83
Techniques (the “ENMOD Convention”) uses similar language.
Consequently, commentary on those documents may provide insight into the application of article 8(2)(b)(iv). In the context of the ENMOD Convention, the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) interprets
the term “widespread” as “encompassing an area on the scale of several
84
hundred square kilometers;” “long-lasting” shall be interpreted as “lasting
85
for a period of months, or approximately a season;” and “severe” shall be
interpreted as “involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human
86
life, natural and economic resources or other assets.” A similar interpretation was suggested by the United Nations Environment Programme
87
(“UNEP”). In contrast, Additional Protocol I’s use of “long-lasting” is
88
commonly understood as referring to a period of decades. Climate crimes
easily satisfy these three requirements since climate impacts are undoubtedly widespread, long-term, and severe, even under the stricter interpretation.
Notably, however, neither the Additional Protocol I, nor the ENMOD
Convention, includes a proportionality test like that in article 8(2)(b)(iv) of
the Rome Statute, requiring the damage to be “clearly excessive in relation
89
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”
In two separate provisions (article 8(2)(b)(ix) for international armed
conflict, and its mirror provision for non-international armed conflict, article
8(2)(e)(iv)), article 8 of the Rome Statute also criminalizes the act of
“[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not
83.
See Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Technique art 1.1, Dec. 10 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter
ENMOD Convention].
84.
CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, Practice Relating to Rule
45, Causing Serious Damage to the Natural Environment, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule45 (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (regarding the ENMOD
Convention); TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 378–79; David Hunter, Private
Sector Liability for Environmental Harm Under International Law, Background Paper Prepared for the International Commission of Jurists’ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes, at 33 (prepared for the International Commission of Jurists’
Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes) (on file with author).
85.
CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, supra note 84.
86.
Id.
87.
U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An
Inventory and Analysis 5 (Nov. 2009) (stating that “[a]s a starting point in developing these
definitions, the precedents set by the 1976 ENMOD convention should serve as the minimum
basis, namely that ‘widespread’ encompasses an area on the scale of several hundred square
kilometers; ‘longterm’ is for a period of months, or approximately a season; and ‘severe’ involves serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural economic resources or
other assets”).
88.
See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 379.
89.
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, art. 8(2)(b)(iv) n.36.
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90

military objectives.” Article 8(2)(e)(iv) was at the center of the Al Mahdi
case, which will be discussed next.

1. The Al Mahdi Case
In this case, the defendant, Mr. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, was charged
with the crime of intentionally directing attacks against nine mausoleums
91
and one mosque in Timbuktu, Mali in 2012. He admitted guilt for the war
crime of attacking protected objects under article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome
92
Statute and was convicted as a co-perpetrator under articles 8(2)(e)(iv) and
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. Consequently, he was sentenced to nine years
93
of imprisonment.
In its decision, the ICC’s Trial Chamber VIII traced back the enhanced
protection of cultural property in international law to articles 27 and 56 of
the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 1919 Commission on Responsibility, and
94
the Geneva Conventions. Reflecting the particular importance of international cultural heritage, the Court stated that “the element of ‘direct[ing] an
attack’ encompasses any acts of violence against protected objects and will
not make a distinction as to whether it was carried out in the conduct of hos95
tilities or after the object had fallen under the control of an armed group.”
The Court further stressed that “international humanitarian law protects cul96
tural objects as such from crimes committed both in battle and out of it.”
While assessing the gravity of the crime, the Court noted that “even if
inherently grave, crimes against property are generally of lesser gravity than
97
crimes against persons.” Still, considering the fact that the targeted build-

90.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv).
91.
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 10.
92.
See Al Mahdi Case: Accused Makes an Admission of Guilt at Trial Opening, INT’L
CRIM. CT. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1236. Interestingly enough, this was the first time in the history of the Court that a defendant has made an
admission of guilt.
93.
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 109.
94.
Id. ¶ 14. The Court also referred to the Additional Protocol I, supra note 82, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8
June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 and to the Second Protocol to The Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, March 26. 1999, 2253
U.N.T.S. 172.
95.
Id. ¶ 15.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. ¶ 77; see also Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG,
Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 145 (May 23, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04476.pdf (distinguishing between “the
crimes of murder and attack against a civilian population on the one hand, and the crimes of
destruction and pillaging, on the other, as the former amount to violence to life whereas the
latter, although significant, amount to threat to property” and expressing the view that there
should be a more severe penalty for the former). The Chamber also emphasized that since the
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ings had not only religious, but also symbolic and emotional value, for the
inhabitants of Timbuktu, the Court concluded that the crime was “of signifi98
cant gravity.” The Court also took into account the fact that all but one of
the targeted sites were United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (“UNESCO”) World Heritage sites and, as such, the attacks
had particular gravity as their destruction affected not just the inhabitants of
99
Timbuktu, but the entire international community.

2. Interim Conclusions
In sum, the category of war crimes could be relevant to the prosecution
of environmental crimes that were committed with connection to an armed
conflict. Under article 8, environmental crimes may be prosecuted as war
crimes either alongside other war crimes, or as the sole crime prosecuted, as
was demonstrated in the Al Mahdi case, where cultural damage alone was
litigated. Notably, in this case the armed conflict did not play a central role
in the decision. The Al Mahdi Court explicitly stated that “the [qualifying]
‘conduct’ is the attack on cultural objects,” and that “what this element requires is not a link to any particular hostilities but only an association with
100
the non-international armed conflict more generally,” suggesting that the
nexus to an armed conflict in article 8 environmental cases could also be
somewhat flexible. Under the Al Mahdi Court’s logic, the qualifying conduct would be environmental destruction, and a general link to an armed
conflict would be sufficient to create a nexus. Nevertheless, an association
to an armed conflict cannot be waived altogether, making article 8 an inept
option for the prosecution of most climate crimes.
Still, the Al Mahdi decision is relevant because it illustrates the significance the ICC attributes to crimes that were not committed directly against
people, but that, nevertheless, have a great effect on them and on the com-

property that was destroyed was essential for the daily lives of the victims, the destruction had
led to their poverty and forced them to leave their homes. Id.
98.
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 82.
99.
Id. ¶¶ 78–80. It is interesting to mention that according to an International Union
for the Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) report, “climate change is the fastest growing threat
to natural World Heritage known to affect world heritage sites.” IUCN World Heritage Outlook 2: A Conservation Assessment of All Natural World Heritage Sites, IUCN (Nov. 2017),
https://www.worldheritageoutlook.iucn.org/home-page. For a discussion of the potential impacts of climate change on World Heritage sites see also UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, Climate Change and World Heritage: Report on
Predicting and Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on World Heritage and Strategy to
Assist States Parties to Implement Appropriate Management Responses (May 2007),
https://whc.unesco.org/document/8874. See also Jørgen Hollesen et al., Climate Change and
the Deteriorating Archaeological and Environmental Archives of the Arctic, 92 ANTIQUITY
363, 573–86 (2018); (showing that intensification of permafrost thaw and coastal erosion are
damaging and destroying a wide range of cultural and environmental archives around the Arctic).
100.
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 18.
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101

mon interest of all humanity. The willingness of the Court to convict Al
Mahdi under these circumstances may serve as a signal of its potential
102
openness towards prosecuting environmental crimes, and it also might be
used as an interpretive tool with regard to the prosecution of climate crimes
under other categories of crimes listed in the Rome Statute.

B. Climate Crimes as Crimes Against Humanity
“Crimes against humanity” were first introduced as legally binding in
1945, when Professor Hersch Lauterpacht proposed the crime for prosecution before the Nuremberg Tribunal, to address atrocities against civilians.
However, the term “crimes against humanity” was coined before that and
was in common use before 1945 “to describe a range of atrocities, including
slavery and the slave trade, as far back as the eighteenth century, including
103
by eminent thinkers like Voltaire and Beccaria.” It was also used in 1915,
in a non-binding, joint declaration made by the French, British, and Russian
governments, in the context of mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman
104
Empire.
The creation of this category of crimes “indicated that the international
community was widening the category of acts considered of ‘meta-national’
concern. This category came to include all actions running contrary to those
basic values that are, or should be, considered inherent in any human be105
ing.” It also “affirmed that international law was not only ‘between States’
106
but ‘also the law of mankind.’”
Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute in107
clude no requirement for a nexus to an armed conflict. Article 6(c) of the

101.
See also OTP POLICY PAPER, supra note 1, ¶ 46.
102.
See also id.
103.
See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 147.
104.
See ANTONIO CASSESE & PAOLA GAETA, CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 84 (3d ed. 2013). The declaration stated that: “In view of these new crimes of Turkey
against humanity and civilization, the Allied governments announce publicly to the Sublime
Porte that they will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman
Government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.” Id.; see also
SANDS, supra note 13, at 111–13.
105.
CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 87.
106.
SANDS, supra note 13, at 113. Interestingly enough, it has been said that the term
“humanity” in “crimes against humanity” was not synonymous with “mankind” or “human
race,” but rather referred to “the quality of being humane.” CASSESE & GAETA, supra note
104, at 87. This may indicate that it is not necessary to show that human beings were harmed
as a result of the act, possibly supporting the recognition of crimes against the environment
per se (such as harm to nature, harm to animals, and biodiversity loss) as crimes against “humanity.” However, in the case of the alleged climate crimes discussed here, this argument is
obviously of less relevance since humans are direct victims of climate change.
107.
As opposed to war crimes, which derive from international humanitarian law, this
category of crimes is viewed as an implication of international human rights law. See
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 147; CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 92.
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Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal has linked crimes against humanity to
108
the other two categories of offences, crimes against peace and war crimes,
and the Nuremberg Tribunal narrowed the scope of this category of offences
by excluding crimes against humanity that had been committed before the
109
war. However, ‘[i]n the years following World War II, the validity of the
110
war nexus was . . . increasingly questioned,” and today international customary law prohibits crimes against humanity regardless of whether they
111
were committed in times of war or in times of peace. This principle is
well reflected in the Rome Statute, which does not require that crimes
112
against humanity have any connection to an armed conflict, leaving the
door open to the possibility of classifying climate crimes as crimes against
humanity.

1. The Contextual Elements of Crimes Against Humanity
The ICC has identified five distinct “contextual elements” of the crimes
113
listed in article 7 of the Rome Statute: (i) an attack directed against any
civilian population; (ii) a state or organizational policy; (iii) an attack of a
widespread or systematic nature; (iv) a nexus between the individual act and
the attack; and (v) the perpetrator’s knowledge of the attack. How these elements apply to the alleged climate crimes is explored below.

i. An Attack Directed Against Any Civilian Population
This element reflects the great innovation made by the Nuremberg
Charter—that individuals could be prosecuted for crimes committed in their
114
official capacity against their own citizens. As clarified by the Elements of
Crimes, for the purposes of article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, an “attack” is
not restricted to a “military attack,” but rather refers to “a campaign or oper-

108.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 58
Stat. 1533, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (“[I]n execution of or connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal[.]”); see CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 86.
109.
See CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 87–88. Although this might have been
due to issues of retroactivity. Id.
110.
See Marjolein Cupido, The Policy Underlying Crimes Against Humanity: Practical
Reflections on a Theoretical Debate, 22 CRIM. L.F. (2011), at 278.
111.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that other international instruments narrow the
scope of the customary rules, such as the Statute of the ICTY, which refers to crimes against
humanity committed in an armed conflict. See CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 90;
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Res. 827 art. 5 (May 25, 1993)
(amended July 7, 2009 by Res. 1877).
112.
CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 90.
113.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of
the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation, ¶ 79 (Mar. 31 2010); see also
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 153.
114.
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 154.
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115

ation carried out against the civilian population.” It should also be noted
116
that an “attack” may be non-violent. An “attack” consists of “a course of
conduct involving the commission of multiple acts referred to in para117
graph 1.” The phrase “course of conduct” has been interpreted by the
Court to indicate “a systemic . . . series or overall flow of events as opposed
118
to a mere aggregate of random acts.”
The object of an attack may be civilian victims of any nationality, ethnicity, or may have other distinguishing features. While it is not required
that the entire civilian population of a given geographical area be targeted,
the civilian population must be the primary object of the attack and cannot
119
merely be an incidental victim of the attack.
Given the broad interpretation adopted in the jurisprudence of the Court
with regard to this requirement, it may be possible to classify the alleged
conduct of the fossil fuel industry as an “attack.” The documents and findings mentioned in Part II indicate that the alleged conduct involved “the
multiple commission of acts,” and it constitutes “a series or overall flow of
events.” The fact that the attack may be non-violent also supports this notion.
As for the “direction” of the attack, it may be claimed that the fossil
fuel companies (or their officials) did not “direct” an attack against a civilian population. Yet, the conduct studies show that although the fossil fuel
companies allegedly knew that their actions were likely to produce severe
environmental consequences, they nevertheless did not alter their conduct in
light of that knowledge. Arguably, this alleged conduct should be viewed as
120
equivalent to “directing” an attack on a civilian population.
In this context, it is perhaps useful to analogize to the principle of proportionality, discussed above in the context of article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the
Rome Statute. The principle is manifested, inter alia, in article 57(2)(a)(iii)
of Additional Protocol I which reads:
an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent
that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
115.
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, art. 7, introduction, ¶ 3 (“The acts need not
constitute a military attack.”).
116.
See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 155.
117.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 80 (as provided for in article 7(2)(a)
of the Rome Statute).
118.
Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ¶ 209 (June 12, 2014).
119.
Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 75–76 (June 15, 2009); Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
Decision, ¶ 82.
120.
The question of the required mens rea that derives from this assertion will be discussed below.
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combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
121
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Indeed, international humanitarian law and international criminal law
consider inflicting collateral damage that is excessive in relation to the an122
ticipated military advantage to be a grave breach of Additional Protocol I
123
and as a war crime respectively. The principle of proportionality is also
manifested in the interpretation given to article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (the right to life). According
to the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 36 on article 6 of the
ICCPR, “indiscriminate attacks, [and] failure to apply the principles of precaution and proportionality . . . would also violate [the right to life in] article
124
6 of the Covenant.”
To pull the analogy full circle, in the context of the alleged climate
crimes, fossil fuel companies’ desire to make maximum profit may be considered as the equivalent of a drive for “military advantage,” and the severe
and irreversible impacts of climate change may be the equivalent of “collateral damage” expected to occur. Thus, though the concept of proportionality
does not directly apply to peacetime conduct, this analogy may support the
notion that, to prove an attack was “directed,” it is sufficient to show that
the perpetrator knew about the potential consequences of his or her action
125
on the civilian population, and nevertheless continued that action. Therefore, when corporations (or corporate executives) engage in an activity that
is expected to cause severe and irreversible “collateral damage”—such as
the effects of climate change—they may be found to have “directed” an attack against a civilian population.

ii. A State or Organizational Policy
This contextual element requires the attacks against any civilian population to have been committed “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or or126
ganizational policy to commit such attack.” The Elements of Crimes offer
further clarification, stating that “[i]t is understood that [the term] ‘policy to
commit such an attack’ requires that the State or organization actively pro121.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 82, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
122.
See id., art. 85(3)(b).
123.
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
124.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life art. 64, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018) [hereinafter General Comment 36]; see also id. art. 66 (stressing that “[t]he threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons,
which are indiscriminate in effect and are of a nature to cause destruction of human life on a
catastrophic scale is incompatible with respect for the right to life and may amount to a crime
under international law”).
125.
This notion also pertains to the mental element required, as will be discussed below.
126.
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a).
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mote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population.” It should
be emphasized that a “policy” may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action that is consciously aimed at
128
encouraging such attack.
The terms “policy” and “State or organizational”—which are not defined in the Statute—were interpreted by the Court as requirements aimed at
ensur[ing] that the attack, even if carried out over a large geographical area or directed against a large number of victims, must still be
thoroughly organised and follow a regular pattern. It must also be
conducted in furtherance of a common policy involving public or
private resources. Such a policy may be made either by groups of
persons who govern a specific territory or by any organisation with
the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population. The policy need not be explicitly defined by the
organisational group. Indeed, an attack which is planned, directed
or organised—as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of vio129
lence—will satisfy this criterion.
The conduct studies in Part II suggest that the fossil fuel companies allegedly acted in accordance with a carefully planned and organized policy,
intended to undermine the public understanding of scientific research, promote climate change denial, and use science and public skepticism to prevent environmental regulation. The conduct studies and findings also
showed that these fossil fuel companies’ actions were allegedly conducted,
inter alia, by the “Smoke and Fumes Committee”—a group created specifically for this purpose.
A key question pertaining to the “organizational” requirement is whether it requires the involvement of a state-like organization. In this sense, the
policy requirement “is essential for distinguishing international crimes from
130
‘ordinary’ domestic criminality,” and “functions as a safeguard [so] that
131
the ICC does not deal with sporadic instances of large-scale violence.” In
the Kenya decision, the Court stressed that “the formal nature of a group and
the level of its organization should not be the defining criterion” but rather
“a distinction should be drawn on whether a group has the capability to per132
form acts which infringe on basic human values.” The Court determined

127.
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, art. 7, introduction, ¶ 3; cf. Cupido, supra
note 110, (arguing that it is not clear whether the policy requirement is an autonomous element of crime or a factual circumstance).
128.
Id. art. 7, introduction, ¶ 3 n.6.
129.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 84; Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC01/04- 01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 396 (Oct. 14, 2008).
130.
See Cupido, supra note 110.
131.
Thomas Obel Hansen, The Policy Requirement in Crimes Against Humanity: Lessons from and for the Case of Kenya, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 39 (2011).
132.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 90.
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that “organizations not linked to a State may, for the purposes of the Statute,
elaborate and carryout a policy to commit an attack against a civilian popu133
lation.” It was also stated that
the determination of whether a given group qualifies as an organization under the Statute must be made on a case-by-case basis. In
making this determination, the Chamber may take into account a
number of considerations, inter alia: (i) whether the group is under
a responsible command, or has an established hierarchy; (ii) whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population; (iii) whether the
group exercises control over part of the territory of a State; (iv)
whether the group has criminal activities against the civilian population as a primary purpose; (v) whether the group articulates, explicitly or implicitly, an intention to attack a civilian population;
(vi) whether the group is part of a larger group, which fulfils some
134
or all of the abovementioned criteria.
The Court emphasized, though, that these considerations “do not consti135
tute a rigid legal definition, and do not need to be exhaustively fulfilled.”
Accordingly, a private entity, such as a multinational fossil fuel corporation,
may qualify as an “organization” under the Statute.
It should be noted that in a dissenting opinion to the Kenya decision,
Judge Kaul expressed a more restrictive interpretive approach with regard to
136
the “organizational” requirement: An “organization” may be a private entity (a non-state actor, and not an organ of a state or acting on behalf of a
state), however, “organizations” should still “partake of some characteristics
of a State” such as:
(a) a collectivity of persons; (b) which was established and acts for
a common purpose; (c) over a prolonged period of time; (d) which
is under responsible command or adopted a certain degree of hierarchical structure including, as a minimum, some kind of policy
level; (e) with the capacity to impose the policy on its members and
to sanction them; and (f) which has the capacity and means availa137
ble to attack any civilian population on a large scale.

133.
Id. ¶ 92.
134.
Id. ¶ 93.
135.
Id.
136.
Id. ¶¶ 38–40 (Kaul, J., dissenting). Judge Kaul compared the English text of the
Statute to other languages (French, Spanish, and Arabic), and concluded that whereas according to the English text, the “policy” needs only to be “organizational,” the text in other languages clearly refers to the requirement that a policy be adopted by an “organization,” “which
established or at least endorsed a policy to commit such an attack.”
137.
Id. ¶ 51.
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These criteria, according to the dissent, are meant to distinguish an “organization” from “groups of organized crime, a mob, groups of (armed) civilians
138
or criminal gangs.” Additionally, “‘organizational policy’ must be estab139
lished at the policymaking level of the ‘organization.’”
Judge Kaul also warned against expanding the concept of crimes
against humanity to any infringement of human rights, as well as against the
140
“banalization” or “trivialization” of the crimes listed in the Statute, due to
the fact that “the ICC serves as a beacon of justice intervening in limited
cases where the most serious crimes of concern to the international commu141
nity as a whole have been committed.”
Yet even under the dissent’s strict interpretation, a private entity such as
a multinational fossil fuel corporation may be recognized as an “organization.” Indeed, though multinational corporations do not “exercise control
over part of the territory of a State,” they clearly are “a collectivity of persons” that were “established and act for a common purpose . . . over a prolonged period of time.” They have “adopted a certain degree of hierarchical
structure including . . . some kind of policy level” and have the “capacity to
impose the policy on [their] members and to sanction them.” They also have
“the capacity and means available to attack any civilian population on a
large scale” (in the non-violent sense of “attack”), as well as “the means and
resources available to reach the gravity of systemic injustice in which parts
142
of the civilian population find themselves.”
As presented in the CIEL Smoke and Fume Report, “the petroleum industry has long been highly coordinated, acting through centralized industry
143
associations.” The Committee on Smoke and Fumes was allegedly established to fund research into the causes of air pollution and “to actively
communicate with ‘interested organizations in industry, research, government, and the public,’” in order “to avoid ‘the hasty passage of a law or
144
laws for the control of a given air pollution situation.’” These findings
demonstrate that fossil fuel companies may qualify as organizations for the
purposes of their prosecution for crimes against humanity.
Indeed, in opposing the recognition of a private entity as an organization in the context of article 7 of the Rome Statute, Judge Kaul’s dissenting
opinion in the Kenya decision resorted to a “slippery slope” argument,
warning against the “banalization” of this category of crimes. However,
given the severity of the climate crisis, which is viewed as a “common con138.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 55; see also 1 M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATED TEXT, 151–52 (2005).
139.
Id. ¶ 68.
140.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 55 (Kaul, J., dissenting).
141.
Id. ¶ 65.
142.
Id. ¶ 66.
143.
CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.
144.
CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 9.
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145

cern of humankind,” and considering the alleged conduct of the fossil fuel
companies described above (and in particular the alleged decades-long,
carefully planned campaign to mislead the public, shareholders, and policymakers), the fear of banalization does not appear to be relevant.

iii. Widespread or Systematic Attack
This element requires that the act was “committed as part of a wide146
spread or systematic attack.” In the jurisprudence of the Court, these two
conditions—widespread and systematic—have been interpreted as disjunctive, meaning that “the alleged acts must be either widespread or systematic
147
to warrant classification as crimes against humanity.” This requirement
was said to be aimed at “exclud[ing] isolated or random acts from the notion
148
of crimes against humanity.” Broadly speaking, the Court has also
stressed that “the adjective ‘widespread’ connotes the large-scale nature of
the attack and the number of targeted persons, whereas the adjective ‘systematic’ refers to the organised nature of the acts of violence and the im149
probability of their random occurrence.”
More specifically, the Court has interpreted the term “widespread” as
requiring that the attack be “massive, frequent, carried out collectively with
150
considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.” A
widespread attack may be the “cumulative effect of a series of inhumane
acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magni151
tude.” Similarly, it may be either an attack “carried out over a large geographical area or an attack in a small geographical area directed against a
152
large number of civilians.”

145.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, decision 1/CP.21 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
146.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1).
147.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya Decision, ¶¶ 94–95 (emphasis added);
TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 156. But see SCHABAS, COMMENTARY, supra
note 38, at 165–66 (stressing that although it has been argued that these requirements—
”widespread” and “systematic”—are cumulative, there is little practical significance to this
approach since the two conditions tend to overlap).
148.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 94; TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY,
supra note 40, at 156 (noting that this was also the approach taken by the United Nations War
Crimes Commission (“UNWCC”) “speaking of crimes ‘which either by their magnitude and
savagery or by their large number or by the fact that a similar pattern was applied . . . endangered the international community or shocked the conscience of mankind.’”).
149.
Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,
¶ 394 (Oct. 14, 2008).
150.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 95.
151.
Id.
152.
Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 83 (June 15, 2009).
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As for the term “systematic,” it was interpreted as requiring that the acts
of violence “be characterized as organized in nature and manifesting a pattern ‘in the sense of non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on
153
a regular basis.’” For instance, an attack was considered “systematic”
when it “lasted for over five years and the acts of violence of which it was
154
comprised followed, to a considerable extent, a similar pattern.”
On the face of it, the alleged conduct discussed in this article satisfies
both requirements: The effects of climate change are experienced across the
globe, by a large number of victims, including people, communities, and
wildlife, and it will most probably have a profound effect on future generations. Climate impacts are known to be massive, frequent, and of a large155
scale nature. In light of these characteristics of climate change, it seems
very likely that the attack at issue may be considered as “widespread.”
Due to the fact that these requirements—widespread and systematic—
were interpreted as being disjunctive, there is no need to show a climate
crimes attack is both “widespread” and “systematic.” Nonetheless, it seems
that the alleged attack at issue is indeed “systematic.” The documents discussed in Part II (the conduct research and findings) suggest that the attack
was carefully planned and carried out over decades, and that it was repeated
and was not of a random nature. According to the CIEL Smoke and Fumes
Report, the events described in the report “are not isolated incidents, but rather demonstrate a systemic, decades-long pattern of climate understanding,
156
denial, and obstruction,” and “the industry . . . engaged in ongoing and
systematic efforts to convince the public that climate science was uncertain,
climate risks were nonexistent or exaggerated, or that vital measures to reduce carbon emissions and promote cleaner energies were unwarranted or
157
not feasible.”

iv. A Nexus Between the Individual Act and the Attack
This element requires a link between the acts committed by the accused
and the attack against the civilian population. For this purpose, “the Cham158
ber must consider the nature, aims and consequences” of the act.
“[I]solated acts which clearly differ, in their nature, aims and consequences,
from other acts forming part of an attack, would fall outside the scope of ar-

153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [“IPCC”], CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT (R.K. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer eds., 2014); IPCC, Global Warming
of 1.5 °C (Oct. 6, 2018), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15.
156.
CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 18.
157.
Id. at 19.
158.
See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 98.
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159

ticle 7(1) of the Statute.” Although it is not necessary to show that an act
itself was widespread or systematic—even a single act may satisfy the requirements of article 7(1)—it is necessary to show that the act was committed in the broader context of the attack, “in terms of [its] characteristics, na160
ture, aims, targets and alleged perpetrators, as well as times and location.”
The documents discussed in Part II reveal a series of allegedly carefully
planned acts, whose nature, aims, and consequences suggest that they were
committed as part of the broader context of the alleged attack.

v. Knowledge of the Attack
Article 7 requires that the punishable act be committed not just with a
nexus to, but “with knowledge of,” the widespread or systematic attack. The
Elements of Crime clarify the requisite knowledge, for each punishable act,
which exists when “the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
161
against a civilian population.” The Court has interpreted this requirement
as relating to the link between the individual punishable act committed by
the accused and the broader attack, in the sense that it must be proven that
162
the accused knew of the attack “in general terms,” as well as of the fact
163
that his or her acts would be part of it. Nevertheless, there is no need for
the Prosecutor to show that the accused had detailed knowledge pertaining
to the entire attack, nor is it necessary to show that he or she had the precise
164
details of the policy or plan of the state or organization.
According to the Court’s jurisprudence, such knowledge
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as: the accused’s position in the military hierarchy; his assuming an important role in the broader criminal campaign; his presence at the

159.
Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, Decision Pursuant
to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation, ¶ 89 (Nov. 15,
2011); SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 166–67.
160.
Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Decision, ¶ 209.
161.
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79.
162.
See Prosecutor v. Gombo, Decision, ¶ 87 (June 15, 2009).
163.
TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 175-76; Prosecutor v. Gombo, Decision, ¶ 87. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has rejected the interpretation that “knowledge also
includes the conduct ‘of a person taking a deliberate risk in the hope that the risk does not
cause injury.’” Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 126–28
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No.
IT-95-14-T, Judgment ¶ 254 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000);
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 168.
164.
In the Elements of Crimes, it is explicitly stated that the knowledge requirement
“should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization.”
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 81.
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scene of the crimes; his references to the superiority of his group
over the enemy group; and the general historical and political envi165
ronment in which the acts occurred.
It may also be inferred from factors such as “the scope and gravity of the
acts perpetrated, the nature of the crimes committed, and the degree of
166
which they are common knowledge.”
Notably, according to article 30(1)—which is the general mens rea requirement in the Rome Statute—it is necessary to show that “the material
167
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.” The relationship between the general requirement of article 30 and the knowledge requirement
of article 7(1), is described in the Gombo decision: Article 7(1) “is an aspect
168
of the mental element under article 30(3) of the Statute.” A somewhat nuanced view is expressed in the Triffterer Commentary, stating that the
knowledge requirement of article 7(1) “constitutes an additional mental element to be distinguished from the general mens rea requirement of article
169
30.” Either way, under both approaches, it is necessary to prove the two
different components of article 30—intent and knowledge—in order to establish criminal responsibility.
The main question in this respect pertains to the standard for intent under article 30 of the Statute. According to article 30, it is necessary to show
170
that the accused “means to engage in the conduct” and that he or she
“means to cause the consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordi171
nary course of events.” Additionally, it should be proven that the accused
had “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the
172
ordinary course of events.” The article 30 requirements apply to the different material elements of each crime in the Statute, but “[t]he exact scope
of this application . . . has to be inferred for each crime depending on the
173
specific material elements set out in the definition of the crime.”
In the case of the alleged climate crimes, it may be assumed that fossil
fuel companies (or their corporate officials) were not driven by an intention
to cause damage to the environment, but rather by their aim to maximize
174
profit, with environmental damage only a by-product of their conduct.

165.
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision, ¶ 402.
166.
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 168; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, ¶
259.
167.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30(1).
168.
Prosecutor v. Gombo, Decision, ¶ 87 (emphasis added).
169.
See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 176 (emphasis added).
170.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30(2)(a).
171.
Id. art. 30(2)(b).
172.
Id. art. 30(3).
See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 1113.
173.
174.
Cf. Commentary of the ILC to Article 26, ¶ 6 (regarding the word “willfully” in
article 26 of the ILC draft).

520

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 41:491

Nonetheless, the conduct studies suggest that these companies “have been
aware of the risks of climate change, and their products’ role in exacerbat175
ing those risks, for at least six decades,” and yet they have allegedly continued to peddle their products and use industry-funded research in order to
176
increase public skepticism about climate change.
177
Arguably, such conduct may qualify as equivalent to intent, if the
mental state of dolus eventualis falls within the scope of article 30 of the
Statute. Under one common definition of dolus eventualis, a perpetrator acts
with this mental state if he or she “foresees that his or her action is likely to
produce its prohibited consequences, and nevertheless willingly takes the
178
risk of so acting.”
The question whether article 30 may be read to include dolus eventualis
is quite controversial:”[T]he drafting history of the Rome Statute suggests
that dolus eventualis was explicitly considered and rejected by the drafters
of the Rome Statute, because doing so ‘might send the wrong signal that
these forms of culpability were sufficient for criminal liability as a general
179
rule.’” This may support the idea that dolus eventualis does not fall within
the scope of article 30. The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber in the Gombo decision
adopted this approach, concluding that “such concepts [dolus eventualis,
recklessness, or any lower form of culpability] are not captured by article 30
of the Statute. This conclusion is supported by the express language of the
phrase ‘will occur in the ordinary course of events,’ which does not accommodate a lower standard than the one required by dolus directus in the sec180
ond degree (oblique intention).” Nevertheless, “commentators and some
judges continue to maintain that dolus eventualis falls within the Rome
181
Statute’s Article 30 default rule.”
No doubt, the question of whether dolus eventualis falls within the
scope of article 30 or not may be a crucial one with regard to the possibility
of classifying the alleged climate crimes as crimes under the Rome Statute.
Whereas the “knowledge” requirement of article 7 may be satisfied by the
findings discussed in Part II, suggesting that the companies knew about the
likely consequences of their conduct, the general “intent” requirement under
article 30(1) poses a substantial bar. As mentioned above, it seems that the
corporations did not intend to harm the environment, but rather to make

175.
See CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 1.
Id. at 21.
176.
177.
According to this approach, an action and its consequences may be viewed as “a
package deal,” making “the distinction between intent and foresight . . . illusory.” See Jens D.
Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79, 126 (2013).
178.
Id. at 88.
179.
Id. at 101.
180.
See Prosecutor v. Gombo, Decision, ¶ 360 (emphasis in original); see also
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 632.
181.
Ohlin, supra note 177, at 103–10 (offering several arguments to support the inclusion of dolus eventualis in article 30).
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maximum profit. Yet if a reduced mental state such as dolus eventualis satisfies article 30, the alleged climate crimes may nevertheless be prosecutable before the ICC.
The next part will examine the relevant punishable acts listed in this
category of crimes.

2. Relevant Punishable Acts
The most relevant punishable acts listed after the chapeau of article 7
182
are probably “deportation or forcible transfer of population” and the re183
sidual crime of “other inhumane acts.” This section will examine their applicability to the alleged conduct of the oil and gas corporations, focusing
on liability for the forced displacement of communities vulnerable to the
184
adverse effects of climate change.

i. Deportation or Forcible Transfer of Population
Article 7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute defines “deportation or forcible
transfer of population” as “forced displacement of the persons concerned by
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully
present, without grounds permitted under international law.” Arguably,
since the effects of climate change are associated with migration, the alleged
conduct of the fossil fuel companies may be considered “other coercive
acts” causing forced displacement.
The Elements of Crime clarify that “[t]he term ‘forcibly’ is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by tak185
ing advantage of a coercive environment.” In a similar vein, the ICC PreTrial Chamber II has stated that “deportation or forcible transfer of popula186
tion is an open-conduct crime” and that “in order to establish that the
crime of deportation or forcible transfer of population is consummated, the
Prosecutor has to prove that one or more acts that the perpetrator has per187
formed produced the effect to deport or forcibly transfer the victim.”
182.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(d).
183.
Id. art. 7(1)(k).
184.
See IPCC, IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land: Summary for Policymakers (Aug. 2019), at A.5.7 (stating that “[c]hanges in climate can amplify environmentally induced migration both within countries and across borders”); Anouch Missirian & Wolfram Schlenker, Asylum Applications Respond to Temperature Fluctuations, 358 SCI. 1610–14
(Dec. 2017) (suggesting that climate change will drive a huge increase in the number of migrants seeking asylum in Europe if current trends continue); ANA NÚÑEZ, CIEL, THE INUIT
CASE STUDY (2007), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Inuit_CaseStudy_Sep07.pdf.
185.
See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, art. 7(1)(d) n.12.
186.
Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) to the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 244–45 (Jan. 23, 2012).
187.
Id.
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Therefore, in order to establish that fossil fuel companies have committed
the crime of deportation or forcible transfer of population, the Prosecutor
will need to prove that their alleged conduct has “produced the effect” of
forced displacement.
According to this interpretation, and given that the prohibition is aimed
at “safeguarding the right and aspiration of individuals to live in their com188
munities and homes without outside interference,” the acts allegedly
committed by the fossil fuel companies may be found to have produced the
effect of forcible displacement.
True, there is a considerable gap between the alleged conduct and this
outcome because it may take years, or even decades, for climate change to
cause forced displacement, and not only is migration the last link in a long
chain of climate effects, but it is also driven by a multitude of factors. These
characteristics may constitute a major difficulty with regard to the plausibility of classifying the alleged climate crimes as crimes of forcible displacement (and may also prove to be an obstacle with regard to temporal jurisdic189
tion).
The mens rea for this punishable act requires both “intent and
knowledge relating to the forcible displacement of persons from territory in
190
which they are lawfully present.” According to the conduct studies and
findings mentioned in Part II, fossil fuel companies’ officials allegedly
knew, through cutting-edge scientific research, about the different impacts
of climate change. That being said, however, the multi-causal nature of the
harm as well as the considerable gap between the alleged conduct and its
specific outcome may prove to be yet another hurdle with regard to the dolus eventualis standard of intent, since it may be difficult to show that the
corporate officials foresaw that their actions would produce these specific
consequences. Nonetheless, the robust body of documentary evidence described in Part II indicates that oil and gas companies “had a deep and profound understanding of the relationships between sea levels, atmospheric
191
temperatures, and carbon in the environment.” These documents suggest
that oil and gas corporations and corporate executives have been aware of
the effects of rising levels of CO2 and increased temperatures, including
192
melting ice caps, sea level rise, and warming oceans. This documentary
evidence may be used to establish the required mens rea for this punishable
act.

188.
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 218 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003).
189.
It has been argued that the act of forcible displacement is not of continuous nature,
since it puts an emphasis on the conduct itself. See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note
40, at 268.
190.
TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 268.
191.
CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 11.
192.
Id. at 12, 15.
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ii. Other Inhumane Acts
Article 7(1)(k) also includes “other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental
or physical health” as one of the punishable acts under this category of
crimes.
Contrary to the Nuremberg Charter and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) Statutes, the Rome Statute contains certain
limitations on what constitutes an inhumane act, compelling a narrower and
more restrictive interpretation than given to similar provisions in those in193
struments. These limitations pertain both to the action constituting an inhumane act, which must be “of similar character” to the other acts in article
194
7(1), and to the consequence required as the result of an inhumane act,
i.e., “great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
195
health.” The similarity assessment, which “involves a value judgment” is
196
to be conducted “on a case-by-case basis.” Therefore, the possibility of
classifying the alleged climate crimes as “other inhumane acts” depends, to
a great extent, on prosecutorial and judicial discretion.
It has also been emphasized by the Court that “inhumane acts are to be
considered as serious violations of international customary law and the basic
rights pertaining to human beings, drawn from the norms of international
197
human rights law.”
The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II has noted that:
the language of the relevant statutory provision and the Elements of
Crimes, as well as the fundamental principles of criminal law, make
it plain that this residual category of crimes against humanity must
be interpreted conservatively and must not be used to expand un198
critically the scope of crimes against humanity.
Moreover, due to the residual nature of this crime, the Court has concluded that “if a conduct could be charged as another specific crime under
199
this provision, its charging as other inhumane acts is impermissible.”
Hence, if the Prosecutor determines that the alleged climate crimes fall
within the scope of “deportation or forcible transfer of population,” they
may not be charged as “other inhumane acts” (unless there is “at least one

193.
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 207.
194.
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision, ¶ 450.
195.
TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 238, n.576.
196.
Id. at 239.
197.
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision, ¶ 448.
198.
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 269 (Jan. 23, 2012).
199.
Id.; see also TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 237.
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materially distinct element that is not adequately reflected in other acts un200
der paragraph 1”).
When examining the different cases in which the Court has made use of
this provision, it seems that it has primarily been applied to cases of extreme
violence, and seldom has it been discussed with regard to cases of lesser seriousness. Still, it may be applicable to acts of destruction of property, “to
201
the extent that there is evidence that it causes extreme mental suffering.”
As for the mens rea requirement, article 7(1)(k) explicitly requires that the
acts be committed with the intent to cause “great suffering, or serious injury
to body or to mental or physical health.” This requirement obviously narrows the scope of this provision even more and makes it difficult to prosecute the alleged climate crimes at issue, which were not committed with
such intent (unless a more relaxed understanding of “intent” is adopted,
202
such as dolus eventualis).

C. Climate Crimes as Genocide
The term “genocide” was first introduced in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin.
203
Though not included in the Nuremberg judgment, the crime of genocide
was recognized in the 1946 General Assembly Resolution 96(1) and, later
on, in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
204
of Genocide.
As opposed to Lauterpacht’s approach (manifested, as discussed above,
in “crimes against humanity”), “which was motivated by a desire to reinforce the protection of each individual, irrespective of which group he or
205
she happened to belong to,” Lemkin focused on the group, since he believed that “individuals were targeted because they were members of a par206
ticular group, not because of their individual qualities.”
Following Lemkin’s approach, the chapeau of article 6 of the Rome
Statute defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such . . .” As the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the Court has stated, “the definition of the crime of genocide aims at protecting the existence of a specific
207
group or people.” It should be noted that the provision is restricted to na-

200.
See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 237.
201.
See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 209; see also Prosecutor v.
Muthaura, Decision, ¶ 279.
202.
See text accompanying notes 180–184.
203.
See SANDS, supra note 13, at 372.
204.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12,
1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
205.
See SANDS, supra note 13, at 291.
206.
Id.
207.
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 135; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Decision
on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 115.
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208

tional, ethnical, racial or religious groups, following the definition of the
209
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
In limited circumstances, environmental destruction might qualify as an
international crime of genocide: “In some cases, particularly where small
indigenous populations are closely tied economically, spiritually and culturally to their land and local environment, severe environmental impacts can
210
threaten the cultural survival of the group.”
However, proving mens rea may be a substantial obstacle in this con211
212
text. As “one of the worst crimes known to humankind,” genocide re213
quires specific intent (dolus specialis). Notably, however, in the case of a
plan or a policy, the relevance of specific intent declines dramatically, and
the focus is on knowledge of the plan or policy rather than on intent (a
214
“knowledge-based approach”).
Because the adverse effects of climate change are experienced by individuals and communities across the globe, irrespective of their affiliation to
a certain group, it cannot be claimed that a specific group was targeted by
the fossil fuel companies, nor can it be asserted that these companies had
any intent to do so. And even if the fossil fuel companies knew with substantial certainty about the eventual need of certain groups to migrate due to
climate impacts, they most probably did not have a plan aimed at achieving
this outcome.
Curiously enough, in 2010, a proposed amendment to the Rome Statute
was submitted by Polly Higgins, urging the ILC to add a fifth crime to the
215
Rome Statute—the crime of ecocide. The proposed amendment, which
216
builds on Lemkin’s concept of “cultural genocide,” defines “ecocide” as
“the extensive destruction, damage to or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that
peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been severely

208.
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 135–36.
209.
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 204.
210.
See Hunter, Private Sector Liability for Environmental Harm Under International
Law, supra note 84, at 38.
211.
Id. at 39.
212.
Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-17-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
213.
See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 25.
214.
See id.
215.
See generally Anja Gauger et al., The Ecocide Project: ‘Ecocide Is the Missing 5th
Crime Against Peace’, THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSORTIUM AT THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
STUDIES, U. LONDON (2012).
216.
See id. at 6–7.
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diminished.” Additionally, a model law suggested by Higgins defined the
crime of ecocide as those
acts or omissions committed recklessly in times of peace or conflict
by any senior person within the course of State, corporate or any
other entity’s activity which cause, contribute to, or may be expected to cause or contribute to serious ecological, climate or cultural loss or damage to or destruction of ecosystem(s) of a given
territory(ies), such that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants has
218
been or will be severely diminished.
For the purpose of the discussion here, it is worth mentioning that article 3(a) of the proposed model law defined “climate loss” or “damage” or
“destruction” as “impact(s) of one or more of the following occurrences, unrestricted by State or jurisdictional boundaries: (i) rising sea-levels, (ii) hurricanes, typhoons or cyclones, (iii) earthquakes, (iv) other climate occur219
rences.” Article 3(d) added that “[f]or the purposes of paragraph 1: the
Paris Agreement of 4 November 2016 shall be considered established premise for prior knowledge by State, corporate or any other entity’s senior per220
son, or any other person of superior responsibility.” It goes without saying
that if the crime of ecocide was incorporated into the Rome Statute, it would
be extremely relevant to the alleged climate crimes at issue, though attempts
to apply it to past crimes would raise issues of retroactivity.
Although this proposal was not adopted at the international level, some
states have included a crime of ecocide in their own national penal codes.
These states include: Vietnam, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Republic of Mol221
dova, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. If more
states will follow suit, a norm of customary international law may emerge;
however, this process will obviously take time and also would not apply retroactively.

D. Interim Conclusions
When examining whether the alleged conduct discussed in this paper
can be prosecuted under the Rome Statute, it seems that several provisions
of the Rome Statute may apply to the alleged climate crimes. Amongst the
different categories of crimes considered here, the category of crimes
against humanity is probably the most applicable one. Yet, even with regard

217.
Polly Higgins, ERADICATING ECOCIDE: LAWS AND GOVERNANCE TO PREVENT
THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR PLANET 62 (2010); see also ECOCIDE LAW, Proposed Amendment
to the Rome Statute, https://ecocidelaw.com/the-law/what-is-ecocide.
218.
Anthony J. Colangelo & Peter Hayes, An International Tribunal for the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 2 J. PEACE & NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 219, 232 (2019).
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
See Gauger et al., supra note 215, at 12.
221.
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to this category of crimes, many doubts and uncertainties remain as to its
suitability for prosecuting climate crimes.
In contrast to other crimes, the alleged climate crimes at issue are consequential in nature and have an indirect effect both in the sense that they
affect communities and people across the globe irrespective of the place
where the crimes were allegedly committed, and because there is a major
time interval between the alleged acts and their consequences, since it may
take a very long period of time before the effects of a certain act are evident.
These unique features pose substantial challenges, with regard to the element of mens rea as well as offense specific requirements.
The core crimes in the Statute were tailored—and therefore are far more
suited—to the prosecution of actions that take place in a specific time
frame, at a particular location on the globe, and that follow a simple pattern
or causal chain. Naturally, when dealing with these “classic” forms of
crimes, it is easier to examine questions of mens rea and the suitability of
the different punishable acts to the alleged conduct. Also, questions regarding temporal jurisdiction may be simply resolved, since the harm likely occurred at or around the same time as the offense.
By contrast, climate change is a phenomenon that evolves over a long
period of time, as emissions of GHGs stay in the atmosphere for decades
(and even longer), and the changes they cause are gradual in nature. Also,
GHGs emitted at a certain place spread in the atmosphere across the globe,
hence their effect is experienced not only in the place where they were emitted, but also in remote parts of the world. Ultimately, scientific data and
modeling is required to explain the causal link between the causes and the
effects of climate change. That being said, however, it should be emphasized that judicial tribunals are used to dealing with these sorts of complexities (by using expert opinions, for instance); hence, these difficulties should
not stand in the way of prosecuting climate crimes as long as these crimes
fall within the scope of the Rome Statute.
Still, the Rome Statute was not drafted with this kind of crime in mind,
and, as in many other instances, it seems that the law has not caught up with
222
reality. Arguably, it is the task of the courts to translate the written norms
to the changing landscape of crimes, insofar as the language of these norms
allows such translation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec222.
As has been stated by the ICRC in relation to common article 3 of the Geneva Convention:
It is always dangerous to try to go into too much detail—especially in this domain.
However great the care taken in drawing up a list of all the various forms of infliction, it would never be possible to catch up with the imagination of future torturers
who wished to satisfy their bestial instincts; and the more specific and complete a
list tries to be, the more restrictive it becomes.
INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 39 (1958, reprt. 1994); TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY,
supra note 40, at 235.
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ond Circuit stated in the Filartiga case, in the context of the Alien Tort
223
Statute, “[I]t is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world
224
today.”
This approach has the advantage of making use of existing offences to
bring immediate action against perpetrators. Nevertheless, it may contradict
225
the principle of non-retroactivity, and raise concerns with regard to legitimacy. The application of this approach to criminal law is even more controversial, as it runs counter to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
A different approach, taken by several practitioners and scholars, suggests that the Rome Statute should be amended to explicitly include a sui
226
generis crime against the environment. Whereas this option may theoretically be a more appropriate and legitimate one, amendment has its disadvantages, in particular, its dependence on political will and global coopera-

223.
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
224.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also SÉBASTIEN JODOIN &
MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 8 (2013) (“The criminalization of new
forms of harm is consistent with the development of international criminal law, which can be
seen as the successive extension of the principle of individual accountability to a constantly
expanding list of serious violations in international law—piracy and war crimes to begin with;
followed by crimes against humanity, aggression, and genocide in the postwar era; later extending to the other crimes of apartheid and torture; and potentially expanding to offences
such as terrorism in the near term. What is more, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals
have—not without some controversy—consistently expanded the scope of application of existing international crimes to cover a growing variety of acts and conduct, victims, and context.”).
225.
See Markus Kotzur, The Temporal Dimension: Non-Retroactivity and Its Discontents, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (Christian J. Tams et al. eds.,
2014).
226.
See, e.g., STEVEN FREELAND, ADDRESSING THE INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION OF
THE ENVIRONMENT DURING WARFARE UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, at 228–29 (suggesting the addition of a crime of environmental destruction
during an armed conflict); Gauger et al., supra note 222, at 12; Robert McLaughlin, Improving Compliance: Making Non-State International Actors Responsible for Environmental
Crimes, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 377, 392 (2000); Hunter, Private Sector Liability for Environmental Harm Under International Law, supra note 84, at 59–60. Others have
proposed a designated tribunal for environmental issues, though these proposals do not focus
on criminal liability. See generally Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2014); Kenneth F. McCallion & H. Rajan Sharma,
Environmental Justice Without Borders: The Need for an International Court of the Environment to Protect Fundamental Environmental Rights, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON.
(2000). It should also be noted in this context that one of the drafts of the Paris Agreement
suggested the establishment of an International Tribunal of Climate Justice. However, this
tribunal was intended “to address cases of non-compliance of the commitments of developed
country Parties,” and, naturally, it did not deal with corporations. Ultimately, this suggestion
was not accepted in the final document. See Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform
for Enhanced Action, Draft Agreement and Draft Decision on Workstreams 1 and 2, art. 11.7,
No. ADP 2-11 (Oct. 23, 2015).
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tion. Additionally, even if States Parties agree to amend the Statute, it will
228
take time, and the amendment will most probably not apply retroactively.
In contrast, the ICC and the core crimes already listed in the Rome
Statute may provide, in suitable cases, a ready-made solution. Notably,
when the ILC considered adding a separate crime against the environment
to the Rome Statute, some members argued that there was no need for a
separate crime due to the fact that harm to the environment—where it affects international peace and security—would be punishable as an interna229
tional crime under other rubrics of the Statute. This approach is also reflected in the OTP Policy Paper, which does not mention any need to amend
the Statute as a prerequisite for the prosecution of environmental crimes.
In light of these realities, and as at least some provisions of the Rome
Statute may apply to the alleged climate crimes, the article will next explore
whether the Rome Statute’s existing crimes may and should be interpreted
to include environmental crimes. Before that, however, the article will discuss procedural hurdles to the prosecution of the alleged climate crimes.

V. Procedural Hurdles to Prosecuting Climate Crimes
According to article 11(2) of the Rome Statute, “the Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this
230
Statute.” Article 24(1) also clarifies, with respect to individual criminal
responsibility, that “[n]o person shall be criminally responsible under this
231
Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute.” This tem232
poral threshold is considered an absolute bar to prosecution, deviating
from the approach taken by previous international criminal tribunals, which
233
exercised their jurisdiction retroactively.

227.
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121 (stating that an adoption of an amendment
to the Statute requires a two-thirds majority of State Parties). Additionally, according to article
121(5), “any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 . . . shall enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when
committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.” Id.
228.
Due to the urgency posed by the climate crisis, time is obviously a crucial factor.
See generally IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5, supra note 155.
229.
See infra note 254.
230.
It should be emphasized that article 11(2) further states that “[i]f a State becomes a
Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that
State has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3.” Rome Statute, supra note 2, art.
11(2).
231.
See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 341.
232.
See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 657.
233.
See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 339.
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It is important to note that though in general the entry into force date of
234
the Rome Statute is July 1, 2002, there may be a different entry into force
date for each of the States Parties, depending on the date a certain State Par235
ty accepted, approved, or acceded to the Rome Statute. Therefore, questions regarding temporal jurisdiction should be determined depending on the
states involved.
Accordingly, even if the alleged acts of the fossil fuel companies are
found to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court
will be able to exercise jurisdiction only with regard to crimes committed
236
after the relevant entry into force date. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that in cases where the jurisdiction of the Court is “triggered” pursuant to a
Security Council referral (in accordance with article 13(b) of the Statute),
article 11(2) does not apply, and the Court may exercise its jurisdiction with
237
regard to crimes committed after July 1, 2002, regardless of the specific
circumstances pertaining to the state at issue.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that in cases of continuing crimes—
when the conduct constitutes an ongoing course of criminal activity or in
situations where the actus reus is partially completed in the past, but its effects continue after its completion—it may be argued that due to the continuous nature of the acts, the Court may exercise jurisdiction even with regard
238
to acts that took place before the entry into force of the Statute.
In the context of the alleged acts of the fossil fuel companies, the emissions made by these companies stay in the atmosphere for a long period of
time and continue to cause climate impacts. This may also be relevant with
regard to research funded and communications published prior to the relevant entry into force date, but accessible—i.e., not removed or corrected—
after that date. In any case, all emissions and publications that were made
after the relevant entry into force date clearly fall within the jurisdiction of
the Court. Additionally, and irrespective of the question of temporal jurisdiction, both the ICTR and the ICC have held that evidence relating to acts
committed before the entry into force date may be admissible and used in
order to establish intent, to demonstrate a pattern of conduct, or to clarify a
239
given context.
234.
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 126(1).
235.
See id. art. 126(2).
236.
In this context, it should be noted that according to the CIEL Smoke and Fumes
Report, even in recent years, “as the reality of climate change has become all but impossible
to deny, the largest companies have adjusted their strategies from outright denial to questioning the human contribution to climate change, the timing and severity of impacts, and the economic feasibility of reducing emissions.” See CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note
28, at 18.
237.
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 343.
238.
See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 663–69 (referring to cases of
forced disappearance, transfer, and forced deportation, and conscripting or enlistment of children under the age of fifteen); see also SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 341–42.
239.
See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 669–70.
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Another procedural hurdle relates to article 12 of the Statute, which establishes the general rule by which the Court may exercise its jurisdiction
over crimes committed on the territory of a State Party or over crimes committed by a national of a State Party anywhere. Where the fossil fuel companies are based in states that are not parties to the Rome Statute, or in cases
where the alleged acts were committed on territories of states that are not
party to the Statute or by nationals of states that are not parties, it may be
argued that the Court does not have jurisdiction. Notably, however, article
12(2) does not apply in the case of a Security council referral. Additionally,
due to the complex structure of subsidiaries used by multinational corporations in their operations, it is likely that at least some of their acts were
committed in the territory of a State Party or by nationals of one.
To this end, the Court recently ruled in a decision concerning the alleged deportation of members of the Rohingya people from the Republic of
the Union of Myanmar to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh that “the
Court may assert jurisdiction pursuant to article 12(2)(a) of the Statute if at
least one element of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or part of
240
such a crime is committed on the territory of a State Party to the Statute.”
Moreover, the Court specifically emphasized that the rationale of its decision is not restricted to the crime of deportation, and it may apply to other
241
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court as well.
Accordingly, and since the effects of climate crimes are experienced
across the globe and are not limited to the territory of the state where they
were allegedly committed, there may be an argument that some elements of
a crime, or parts of a crime, were committed in the territory of a State Party,
242
thus enabling the Court to assert its jurisdiction pursuant to article 12.

VI. Can—and Should—the Rome Statute Be Interpreted as
Encompassing Environmental Crimes?
As an international treaty, the Rome Statute is subject to the governing
principles of treaty interpretation laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention
243
on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”). Therefore, the Rome Statute “shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
240.
Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a
Ruling on Jurisdiction Under Article 19(3) of the Statute, ¶ 72 (Sept. 6, 2018).
241.
Id. ¶ 74.
242.
Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that in the case of the alleged deportation of
the Rohingya people, the different elements of the crime took place more or less in the same
timeframe, whereas in the case of the alleged climate crimes, there is a considerable gap between the acts attributed to the corporations (or the corporate officials), on the one hand, and
the outcome of these acts, on the other. Therefore, applying this decision to the case at hand
will most probably require broad interpretation of this decision.
243.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [“VCLT”] art. 31, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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244

purpose.” The context of the treaty, for the purpose of interpretation, in245
cludes its preamble and annexes.
Several statements in the preamble to the Rome Statute may be read to
encompass environmental crimes. For instance, the preamble opens with the
statement that States Parties are “[c]onscious that all peoples are united by
common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and con246
cerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time.” Undoubtedly, this “delicate mosaic” is also comprised of the environmental conditions peoples and cultures depend upon. Furthermore, the recognition in the
preamble “that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well247
being of the world” can also be read to include environmental crimes,
which clearly threaten the “well-being of the world.” Finally, the goal of se248
curing the needs and interests of future generations cannot be obtained
249
without giving proper consideration to environmental concerns.
Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that as a source of criminal law,
the Rome Statute is also governed by the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege, as well as the rule of “strict construction” drawn from national legal
250
practice. Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute reads: “The definition of a
crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In
case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person

244.
Id. art. 31(1).
245.
Id. art. 31(2).
246.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
247.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. (noting that the parties were “[d]etermined to
these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole”).
248.
Id.
249.
See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Declaration
on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations, Res. 29/C/31,
art. 1 (Nov. 12, 1997). The Declaration recognizes that
[t]he present generations have the responsibility to bequeath to future generations
an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by human activity. Each
generation inheriting the Earth temporarily should take care to use natural resources
reasonably and ensure that life is not prejudiced by harmful modifications of the
ecosystems and that scientific and technological progress in all fields does not harm
life on Earth.
Id. art. 4. The obligation to safeguard the rights of future generations is also reflected in a
statement by the UN Secretary-General, who described the adoption of the Rome Statute as “a
gift of hope to future generations.” See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 245 n.103 (2014) (citing the statement at the opening
of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Feb. 16, 1999).
250.
See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 93–95 (5th ed. 2017).
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251

being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.” This interpretive approach is
also manifested in the Elements of Crime with regard to crimes against hu252
manity, providing that article 7 of the Rome Statute “must be strictly construed, taking into account that crimes against humanity as defined in article
7 are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international commu253
nity as a whole.”
It should also be noted that the ILC has considered adding a crime
against the environment to the Rome Statute. Article 26 of the ILC’s draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind criminalizes
the act of “willfully caus[ing] or order[ing] the causing of widespread, long254
term and severe damage to the natural environment.” At first, it was suggested that a crime against the environment would complement the category
255
of crimes against humanity. However, later on, environmental offenses
256
were “set apart to form a new, autonomous crime.”
Ultimately, the draft article was not incorporated into the final text of
257
the Rome Statute. This may support a narrow interpretive approach to the
existing provisions, rejecting the idea that the Rome Statute may be read to
251.
See id. (arguing that this is a reaction to the liberal approach taken by the judges in
the Tadić jurisdictional decision, discussed infra note 260).
252.
There is no similar requirement in the ICC Elements of Crime with regard to war
crimes or genocide (yet, the general rule expressed in article 22(2) applies to these crimes).
See ICC Elements of Crime, supra note 79.
253.
ICC Elements of Crime, supra note 79, introduction, ¶ 1; see also SCHABAS
COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 152 (noting that “[o]ut of concern with the uncertain parameters of the crime, the drafters of the Rome Statute included extra language designed to restrain efforts at generous or liberal interpretation, most probably in paragraph 2 of article 7”).
254.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Document ILC(XLVIII)/DC/CRD, Document on Crimes
Against the Environment, Prepared by Mr. Christian Tomuschat, Member of the Commission,
U.N. Doc. ILC(XLVIII)/DC/CRD.3 (Mar. 27, 1996); see SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra
note 38, at 148; Matthew Gillett, Environmental Damage and International Criminal Law, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND TREATY
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 224, at 94.
255.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Document on Crimes Against the Environment, supra note
254, ¶ 5-6.
256.
Id. ¶ 8 (noting that—although article 26 borrowed most of its elements from article
55 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949—article 26, unlike
article 55, also applied in times of peace outside an armed conflict); see also Int’l Law
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of the Forty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (Apr.–July 1991),
reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 107, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (1991) (explaining, in the commentary to article 26, that “[t]he direct source of the present draft article is
article 55, paragraph 1, of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions” but that
“unlike the provision contained in the Protocol, application of this draft article is not confined
to armed conflict”). The crime was meant to be interpreted broadly “to cover the environment
of the human race and where the human race develops, as well as areas the preservation of
which is of fundamental importance in protecting the environment,” i.e., “the seas, the atmosphere, climate, forests and other plant cover, fauna, flora and other biological elements.” Id.
257.
See Int’l Law Comm’n, Document on Crimes Against the Environment, supra note
254, ¶ 9 (describing the different written comments that were received from governments regarding article 26).
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include environmental crimes. However, some members of the ILC have
expressed the view that
there was no need for a separate article on the subject since damage
to the environment, such as willful nuclear pollution or the poisoning of vital international watercourses, would, if it affected international peace and security, be punishable as an international crime
under other rubrics of the Code such as aggression, war crimes and
international terrorism. In this regard, attention was drawn to the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
258
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.
This view strongly supports interpreting the Rome Statute as encompassing environmental crimes, as long as these crimes affect international
peace and security.
It may also be claimed that there is no basis to distinguish between a
crime against the environment and a crime against people in the first place,
since environmental and human rights are indivisibly intertwined. Arguably,
since a crime against the environment affects people and their most funda259
mental human rights, it should be punished correspondingly. This categorization of environmental crimes may be viewed as following the “humanbeing-oriented approach” expressed by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
in the Tadić jurisdictional decision, applying “the maxim of Roman law
hominum causa omne jus constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit
260
of human beings).” According to this approach, the crimes listed in the
Rome Statute should be interpreted as applying to environmental crimes
261
when those affect human beings. Indeed, if environmental crimes have the

258.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its FortySeventh Session, supra note 229, ¶ 121; see also CASSESE ET AL., THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 523 (2002) (asserting that “willful
and serious damage to the environment was a fact of life not just for the present, but for future
generations”). Article II of the ENMOD Convention defines “environmental modification
techniques” as “any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural
processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.’” ENMOD Convention, supra note
83, art. II.
259.
See Marcos Orellana, Court Embraces Right to a Healthy Environment in the
Americas: Ruling Will Empower Citizens, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/court-embraces-right-healthy-environment-americas
(describing a decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights to require state protection of the right to a healthy environment).
260.
Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
261.
It should be emphasized, though, that the ICTY Appeals Chambers based its broad
interpretive approach, inter alia, on the unclear language of some of the provisions of the
ICTY Statute. For instance, the Chamber noted that article 3 of the ICTY Statute, which was
at the center of the discussion in the Tadić case, “lacks any express reference to the nature of

2020]

Prosecuting Climate Crimes at the ICC

535

same outcomes as other international crimes (in particular in terms of their
severity), and the different elements of an existing crime are satisfied, then
arguably there is no need to treat environmental crimes differently.
No doubt, this argument reflects a “utilitarian anthropocentric approach,
valuing the environment to the extent it is able to serve the interests of human beings,” while an ecocentric approach would grant an intrinsic value to
the environment, irrespective of whether human beings suffer as a result of
262
its destruction. Anthropocentrism is open to criticism, and one may argue
263
that nature should have its own legal rights. However, for the sake of the
discussion here, it is perhaps more constructive to focus on a crime’s effects
on humans since the Rome Statute—and, in particular, the category of
crimes against humanity—seems to reflect more of an anthropocentric approach.
The link between harm to the environment and harm to human beings is
well demonstrated in the context of the climate crisis. Climate change “affects the social and environmental determinants of health—clean air, safe
264
drinking water, sufficient food and secure shelter,” and therefore, it has
indisputable implications on the lives, health, and livelihoods of human be265
ings. Climate change is also associated with migration, as well as with na266
tional security issues. The preamble of the Paris Agreement reflects these
concerns: “[C]limate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversi267
ble threat to human societies and the planet.”

the underlying conflict required.” See id. ¶ 71. Therefore, the ability to draw a conclusion
from this decision to the context of the Rome Statute and its elaborated list of crimes may be
limited.
262.
See Gillett, supra note 254, at 75.
263.
See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Towards Legal Rights
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV., 450 (1972); see also PUBLIC RADIO EXCHANGE, Living on Earth: The Amazon as Legal Person (Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.loe.org/shows/
segments.html?programID=18-P13-00016&segmentID=1 (discussing a 2018 ruling of Colombia’s Supreme Court, granting the river and tropical forest of the Colombian part of the
Amazon the legal standing of a person, so ‘guardians’ could sue on its behalf for protection).
264.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Climate Change and Health (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health.
265.
See supra Part III.B.2.i.
266.
See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
CLIMATE-RELATED RISKS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 3 (2015) (“[C]limate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural disasters,
refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources such as food and water. These impacts are
already occurring, and the scope, scale, and intensity of these impacts are projected to increase
over time.”); UN Secretary-General, Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications,
U.N. Doc. A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 2009); Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/15 (July 20, 2011); Letter From the Permanent Representative, New
Zealand, to the Secretary General, United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/2015/543 (July 15, 2015).
267.
Paris Agreement, supra note 145.
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The connection between environmental degradation and human rights is
also manifested in the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of article 6
of the ICCPR. According to the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 36, “Environmental degradation, climate change and unsustainable
development constitute some of the most pressing and serious threats to the
268
ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life.” Thus,
the well-established link between environmental degradation and the threats
it poses to human societies supports the interpretation of crimes aimed at
269
protecting human beings as relevant to environmental crimes as well.
In sum, the competing considerations mentioned above may be used to
support different (and opposing) conclusions, depending on the agenda one
wishes to promote. Therefore, the question of whether the Rome Statute
may be read to include environmental crimes seems to be a matter of discretion. Indeed,
the process of establishing the jurisdiction of international courts
over disputes referred to them inevitably contains strong discretionary features. Through the discretion they exercise at a number of
critical legal junctures that present themselves in the adjudicative
procedure, international courts are able to exercise some degree of
case selection, which tends to be category-based, and not case270
specific.
Although this notion pertains to the discretionary power of international
courts, it may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the interpretive process conducted by the OTP in determining whether a certain case should be investigated and prosecuted. Given that the OTP Policy Paper details the criteria
for case selection, one may naturally assume that these policy considera-

268.
General Comment 36, supra note 124, art. 62; see also Portillo Cáceres v. Paraguay: Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2751/2016, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/126/D/2751/2016, Human
Rights Comm. (Sept. 20 2019), (expressing the view that environmental degradation constitutes a violation of article 6 and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights—the right to life and the right to freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with
privacy, family, or home, respectively); see also Human Rights Comm., Teitiota v. New Zealand: Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, ¶ 9.11 (January 7 2020) (expressing the view that “without robust national and international efforts, the
effects of climate change in receiving states may expose individuals to a violation of their
rights under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant”).
269.
This link may also support the notion of corporate liability, given the “corporate
duty to respect human rights.” See U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
supra note 49.
270.
YUVAL SHANY, QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 104 (2016). Additionally, “the most important occasion for the exercise of judicial discretion in connection with case selection, applied by all international
courts, involves the interpretation of the judicial provisions governing their operation.” Id. at
105.
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tions—including the focus on environmental crimes—will be taken into account by the Prosecutor in the process of determining whether the alleged
conduct of fossil fuel companies falls within the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court, however, is obviously not bound by these policy considerations and is free to exercise different ones. Nevertheless, the mere existence of these explicit policy goals may prompt a discussion with regard to
environmental crimes and bring them into the spotlight in the adjudicative
procedure.
This discussion may include, inter alia, the different considerations that
warrant prosecution before the ICC, rather than resolution through noncriminal avenues or before national jurisdictions. Indeed, as in many other
instances, criminal prosecution is not necessarily the only way to achieve
the goals of justice, deterrence, public condemnation, and utility. Nonetheless, the international community has found it important, for various reasons, to establish a permanent international criminal court, so that those who
commit “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole,” and that “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the
271
world” will “not go unpunished.” Therefore, one may argue that there is
no justification for excluding from the jurisdiction of the Court severe and
irreversible environmental crimes that threaten the peace, security, and wellbeing of the world.
Moreover, prosecuting environmental crimes before the ICC—if
deemed possible—will play an important role in generating deterrence. In
the case of corporate environmental crimes, not only will it have a profound
impact on corporate officials, but it will also be a game-changer with regard
to the corporations themselves; the risk of criminal prosecution and the
heavy damage it might cause could lead to a deep organizational change at
the firm level.
Furthermore, in addition to ending impunity and generating deterrence,
the prosecution of environmental crimes before the ICC will also play a crucial role in promoting the global acceptance of international norms regarding the recognition of environmental crimes, and will also support the de272
velopment of international criminal law. Additionally, “as international
trials are, by definition, more visible and are often regarded more credible
than national proceedings, holding trials at the ICC signals the determina273
tion of the international community to stigmatize deviant behavior.”
Hence, prosecution before the ICC could convey a loud and clear message
of condemnation. Finally, due to the fact that the Rome Statute enables the
274
participation of victims in the proceedings and sets forth a mechanism for

271.
272.
227–29.
273.
274.

Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
See Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 249, at
Id. at 236.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 68.
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the reparation to victims, prosecution before the ICC may also serve the
276
goal of victim satisfaction. For instance, in the context of the alleged climate crimes, this may be used to provide financial support to climate mitigation and adaptation efforts in communities vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
True, it may be argued that environmental crimes should be prosecuted
before national jurisdictions and not necessarily before the ICC. However,
this argument applies equally to other international crimes, and questions
regarding the appropriate forum should be resolved in accordance with the
277
rules pertaining to the principle of complementarity, which is “part of the
Court’s DNA” and “represents the express will of States Parties to create an
institution that is global in scope while recognizing the primary responsibil278
ity of States themselves to exercise criminal jurisdiction.” It is important
to note that this principle is also reflected in the OTP Policy Paper, which
explicitly recalls “that the goal of the Statute to combat impunity and prevent the recurrence of violence” is “to be achieved by combining the activities of the Court and national jurisdictions within a complementary system
279
of criminal justice.”

VII. Conclusions
The discussion above demonstrates that the question of whether corporations (or corporate officials) can be prosecuted for climate crimes before
the ICC is mostly a matter of prosecutorial and judicial discretion. The language of the Rome Statute presents several significant hurdles to prosecution, both in terms of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and its personal
jurisdiction. However, whereas the explicit wording of article 25(1) will
probably be more difficult to overcome by purposive interpretation, it seems
that the language of the core crimes (and, in particular, crimes against humanity) grants more leeway for creative interpretation, thus making the
question at issue heavily dependent on the willingness of the Prosecutor and
the Court to go the extra mile and expand the scope of existing international
crimes to cover new forms of harm.
Given the substantial challenges to prosecution described above, and
considering that the notion of applying the Rome Statute to the circumstances of corporate climate crimes includes a number of “firsts,” perhaps
the OTP will opt for a one-step-at-a-time approach. For instance, the OTP
may choose to prosecute corporate executives for alleged crimes, and leave
the issue of the ICC’s jurisdiction over legal persons for another day. That
275.
276.
232–33.
277.
278.
279.

Id. art. 75.
See Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 249, at
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶ 10 and arts. 1, 17.
See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 447.
See OTP Policy Paper, supra note 1, ¶ 7.
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being said, however, it may be that expanding the scope of crimes to include
crimes against the environment and broadening the category of perpetrators
to encompass corporations go hand in hand, due to the enormous impact
multinational corporations have on environmental issues.
This article sought to examine the broad question of holding corporations criminally accountable for environmental destruction, through the
prism of climate crimes. It seems that the gravity of climate change, its profound effect on communities, wildlife, and future generations, and its irreversible nature, make it a good test case in this context. In particular, the urgency posed by the climate crisis well illustrates the importance of using
existing tools in order to tackle new threats to the international community
as a whole.
The need to adapt international law to contemporary challenges and to
“adjust its norms to new battlefield conditions, as well as to new patterns of
280
atrocities conduct” is reflected in the priorities set forth in the OTP Policy
Paper. Though the practical implications of the Policy Paper still remain to
be seen, if holding corporations or corporate executives criminally accountable for environmental crimes at the international level is possible, not only
will it promote the goals of justice and deterrence, but it will also accelerate
the development of more robust norms pertaining to corporate accountability in international environmental law.

280.
229.

See Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 249, at

